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Abstract
Increasing demand for more features and bigger roles of software makes soft-
ware more and more complex. Unfortunately, increase in the logical and
organizational complexity of software generally leads to more bugs. Real-
time embedded systems are not exceptions. Hastily written buggy firmware
burned into a TV may not be easily ”patched” by consumers. A best sell-
ing smart phone may be recalled due to the software bugs. These systems
cannot be developed like safety-critical systems due to far more limited time
and budget.
While many software engineering tools are useful in improving the quality
of applications, the same tools are less efficient or inaccurate for system
software. For controlling the residual software bugs in system software such
as operating systems, we need more systematic enforcement in run-time. As
a solution, we propose VEER, a Virtual Execution Environment for Robust
real-time systems. VEER is based on a real-time virtual machine monitor
(RT-VMM) and allows consolidation and partitioning of the subsystems of
real-time embedded systems for better recoverability and service availability.
Since RT-VMM has a complete control over the resource allocation, some of
the important recovery can be made faster by appropriating resources for the
process.
The recovery time is reduced through fault-containment, which is achieved
by the following:
• RT-VMM based partitioning: The temporal and spatial partitioning
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ensures certain execution faults are not propagated beyond the common
execution boundaries.
• eSimplex, an analytic redundancy toolkit for embedded real-time sys-
tems: eSimplex enforces healthy component relations so that content
errors are not propagated beyond component boundary, especially from
less critical ones to more critical ones.
For restart recovery, process resurrection is used for fast and predictable
recovery.
We examined the performance of VEER by comparing the existing real-
time embedded systems and the migrated and reorganized version of the
same systems. The performance overhead of RT-VMM is about 1.7 % if
self-contained, or up to 4.7 % if networked in our experimental setup.
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1 Introduction
Computer reliability has always been an important issue since the early days
of computing. For the first generation computers, the reliability of hard-
ware was a major problem. Being made of thousands of electron tubes and
environment-sensitive components such as mercury delay loops and Williams
tubes, the first generation computers required engineers working around clock
to keep the system operational. Despite the effort, the continuous up-time
was relatively short when compared to today’s computer systems until more
modern technologies such as magnetic core memory were used to improve
the hardware [7, 54].
Today’s computer hardware is much more reliable but software has gotten
very complex. It is becoming harder to build dependable software systems
due to software’s growing logical and organizational complexity. The growing
complexity of software is due to increasing demands for features, and higher
expectations on software capability and innovations. Software complexity
makes it harder to reason about system-wide properties and thus introduces
more chances of having residual bugs in production systems. It has been
reported that debugging, testing, and verification processes range from 50 to
75 percent of the total development cost in a typical commercial development
organization [35]. Real-time embedded systems are no exception. Many soft-
ware projects ranging from cell phone software to complex avionics systems
also face increasing difficulties in making the large integrated software work
reliably [88, 71].
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For this reason, a recent trend such as Recovery Oriented Computing
[68] is gaining interests. For runtime software recovery, restart recovery tech-
niques such as [20] are particularly considered effective because finding cures
for the residual software bugs that cause failures is a costly operation. Wood
reports that up to 80% of bugs that causes failures in production systems
have no fix at the time of failure [89]. This signifies the importance of “post-
mortem” recovery.
1.1 Practice of real-time embedded systems
development
For safety-critical systems, it has been a common practice to separate soft-
ware modules based on their criticality levels, so that the effect of less-critical
component failures on critical components can be controlled. For example,
the flight control system of an airplane, perhaps the most critical software
in the whole system, is isolated from the cabin climate control system, a
less critical one. This has been traditionally achieved by the Federated Ar-
chitecture [76]. In this architecture, each functional unit is implemented in
a separate piece of hardware, thus providing strong partitioning and fault
isolation.
A more advanced architecture, Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) [28,
76] runs all units on one computer or multiple computers connected by a com-
mon bus in a small box. The partitioning and isolation of this architecture
allow software components with different criticality levels to run on the same
machine or share more resources together. For example, Honeywell AIMS
[3], the flight control system for Boeing 777, integrates many subsystems
including flight management, communication, display, thrust management,
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etc.
The presence of government standards and regulations such as FAA’s
DO-178B dictates how these kinds of systems are to be made dependable.
The performance is often sacrificed in order to keep the software complexity
under control so that the code can be analyzed, verified, and finally certi-
fied [38]. For government regulated safety-critical systems, it is required that
the complexity of software (e.g. cyclomatic complexity [64]) is under a prede-
fined threshold. This is to perfect the system in development phase, because
any residual bugs in production systems can cause catastrophic events.
1.2 Dependability issues in real-time
embedded systems
The fault-tolerance or recovery in real-time systems has primarily focused
on hardware. Due to their stringent requirements on timing, roll-forward
mechanisms have dominantly been used. For example, TMR (triple modular
redundancy) is commonly used to detect and mask faults instead of rolling
back. In predictable situations, small-scale software re-execution has also
been used to overcome transient faults such as random bit-flip due to cosmic
radiation. However, the fault detection is usually accomplished by running
two identical copies of software in parallel and comparing the results [62].
Thus this type of fault detection is not meant to deal with software faults,
which would occur on all of the copies at the same time in completely syn-
chronized replicated systems.
In the real-time research community, researche has primarily been con-
ducted on the scheduling aspect of real-time software fault-tolerance. Re-
covery scheduling issues were first systematically addressed and solved by
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Imprecise Computation Model in [60], and recently this initial work was fur-
ther developed and extended by Liverato et al. in [58]. However, Imprecise
Computation Model’s failure and task models are limited and do not capture
real-life low-level issues such as process or OS crashes and recovery.
Apart from the scheduling-related works, it is hard to find established
techniques or sustained efforts in real-time recovery. One of the early at-
tempts to address the real-time software fault-tolerance issues at system-level
is the framework developed by Anderson and Kight [5]. This framework
provides error classification and tracking facility to invoke proper handlers.
Most other run-time architectures are designed to convey the conditions and
properties from the development time modeling and verification, which may
insert various run-time checks. Even though these approaches are effective in
enforcing predetermined properties, proving the correctness of actual binary
code, not models, is hard. It can be made more effective with system-level
run-time recovery mechanisms acting as safety nets to catch something that
models might have missed.
Non-real-time fault-tolerance techniques have also been adopted to real-
time systems. The concept of recovery blocks [74], the method that was
traditionally regarded unsuitable for real-time systems, was also made possi-
ble to be used for real-time systems by distributed execution [45]. N-version
programming (NVP) [6] is an attempt to use redundancy for software fault-
masking, and it is a natural counterpart of TMR for software fault-tolerance.
The most criticisms on NVP are based on the fact that even if multiple ver-
sions of software are developed separately, the faults may not be sufficiently
independent. Analytic redundancy by Sha [80] also challenges the effec-
tiveness of NVP by arguing that concentrated efforts on small core would
yield a better result. While NVP requires one set of specification, analytic
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redundancy requires separate specifications for different types of redundant
modules. Simplex architecture [79] utilizes analytic redundancy and demon-
strates its effectiveness for hard real-time systems.
1.3 Consolidated real-time environment
There are only few prior studies on integrated real-time environment, which
is gaining interests after the adoption of IMA and perhaps by the influence
of the renewed popularity of virtual machine monitors in server and desktop
computing systems. SPIRIT-µkernel is one of the first consolidation architec-
tures from academic research. Although it provides partitioning and allows
multiple instances of operating systems to run on a single platform, it lacks
full virtualization of resources including memory space. This results in ABI
(Application Binary Interface) changes, but it does not affect compatibility
much because its guest operating system only supports single address-space
and binary reuse is not common anyway.
For scheduling in real-time virtual machines, Sha proposes TDM-like
scheduling for the top level (VMM) and rate monotonic or cyclic executives
for the low level (intra-VM) scheduling [81]. This work is the foundation of
the operating environment that is approved by FAA [63] as a safe mechanism
to migrate and consolidate existing real-time systems in virtual execution
environments. Prior to this, consolidation of existing systems would mean
complete recertification, which is extremely costly.
Real-time virtual execution environment has a great potential in improv-
ing software dependability by providing both temporal and spatial isolation
between operating systems. Although there have been many efforts and great
advancements using programming language techniques, formal methods, new
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software engineering processes, etc., there is no cure-all tool. This is espe-
cially true in the case of system software. For instance, most of programming
language-based techniques won’t allow use of assembly language in the code,
which is often inevitable in system software. Unless one builds an entirely
new operating system such as Singularity [42], these tools are limited in its
effectiveness when applied to the existing system software. In fact, even Sin-
gularity relies on the correctness of the basic core components, which are
not fully machine-checkable. Constantly changing (e.g. new device drivers),
complex, and highly optimized nature of system software also makes it harder
to obtain efficient and accurate results using most tools that are otherwise
very helpful in improving application software quality.
For low-level system software components, it is a growing consensus that
we need a software architecture level of support for the isolation and recov-
ery [85]. Real-time virtual machine architecture is strongly partitioned as
suggested in [85] and shares many characteristics with microkernel systems.
For non-real-time systems, VMM has been used for fault-tolerance over
a decade on modern computers. Bressoud and Schneider first implement
the primary-backup approach on virtual machines instead of using multiple
physical machines [13].
Due to recent interest in VMM, many studies have been conducted on
VMM’s role in fault-tolerance. Agbaria and Friedman in [2] used virtualized
architecture to support checkpointing and migration among heterogeneous
systems. LeVasseur et al. achieve device driver fault-containment by sep-
arating drivers in one or more virtual machines and executing using the
original operating system for which they were written. This allows the use
of unmodified drivers as well as improvement of dependability.
Because of the short history of real-time VMM (RT-VMM) and relatively
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low volume of system-level recovery research activities in real-time academic
community, no significant work has been done in this area. This thesis is one
of the first attempts to leverage on the characteristics of RT-VMM in order
to enhance the dependability of real-time embedded systems.
1.4 Overview of the solution
As an architectural solution, we propose VEER, a Virtual Execution Envi-
ronment for Robust real-time systems. VEER is based on a real-time capable
virtual machine monitor (RT-VMM) to enforce the isolation and virtualiza-
tion at the hardware level. We have developed an RT-VMM as the core
of VEER to show how recovery can be efficiently performed for real-time
systems using virtual execution environments.
By allowing multiple real-time systems or subsystems to be safely consol-
idated, underutilized resources can be shared among virtual machines, and
faster and more cost-effective processors can be used efficiently. Likewise, the
“recovery slots” can be shared by multiple virtual machines and need not be
duplicated for each one.
An ideal real-time virtual machine monitor (RT-VMM) would require no
modification from existing real-time systems as long as it met their resource
requirements. In the same sense, any existing software recovery mechanisms
would also continue to work as effective as before in the new consolidated
environment.
In order to minimize recovery times, and more importantly, to meet task
deadlines, a careful planning of recovery is required. With the worst case of
restart recovery times of tasks, we can change the CPU time allocation on
failure. If we have enough slack, it might be possible to recover the failed
7
Critical Task Non−critical Task
Depend
"Use"
Figure 1.1: The Use relationship and Depend relationship. Critical compo-
nents must not semantically depend on non-critical components
task and does not affect any other tasks. There are other cases in which the
scheduler must dynamically adjust its scheduling policy. Instead of making
schedulers complex, we utilize the strong and predictable temporal protection
and partitioning capability of the real-time virtual machine architecture.
The most important rule to enforce in organizing components with vary-
ing degrees of criticality is that critical components shall not depend on the
validity nor availability of service provided by non-critical components. From
the view point of the traditional dependency notion, such a relationship still
is a dependency at the syntactic level, but, at the semantic level, it is not a
typical dependency. This is a weak form of dependency and we call it Use
relationship [30].
Maintaining Use relationship has several benefits:
• Functional independence. Even if a critical component is syntac-
tically dependent on a non-critical component, removal of non-critical
component does not affect the correctness of the critical component.
• Fault isolation. Any type of failure including timing, value, crash,
and hang does not propagate from a non-critical to a critical compo-
nent. Although invalid data can flow between the two components, the
critical component is not compromised by it.
• Ability to maintain critical functions. Critical components are
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not affected by non-critical components, even if the failure rate of non-
critical components is high. Therefore the system can still provide the
critical core functions, leading to a higher availability. With the flat
criticality model, this cannot be achieved.
As described above, maintaining Use relationship frees us from worrying
about fault propagation. We can use an enhanced dependency graph based
on failure semantics mappings [30] to determin the impact of a failure and
pick the best candidate to restart. This process can be recursive as in [18].
In VEER, the overall system availability and service quality can be im-
proved by utilizing the architectural characteristics and other basic design
principles. The resulting systems can recover faster and some reorganization
of subsystems can help mask the performance degradation during failure-
recovery cycles. At a high level, VEER aims to achieve the following:
• Enable consolidation of multiple subsystems of existing or new real-
time subsystems and systems.
• Enforce temporal and spacial partitioning for safety.
• Better utilize under-utilized resources through sharing.
• Maximize the service availability or quality through planned run-time
recovery.
In summary, VEER allows better utilization of resource by consolidation
and improves systems’ robustness with dynamic recovery handling. Since
the RT-VMM is fully virtualized, multiple operating systems can coexist in
a machine. Compared to process-level or OS-level virtualization, this type of
full virtualization can withstand OS-level failures. This is important because
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the low-level system software is often difficult to analyze and verify due to
its use of assembly code and highly optimized nature.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the
peculiarities of real-time recovery; Chapter 3 describes an efficient real-time
restart mechanism; Chapter 4 describes how eSimplex implements analytic
redundancy for embedded real-time systems; Chapter 5 deals with the prin-
ciples and implementation of the real-time virtual machine monitor; Chapter
6 shows how RT-VMM is used for recovery; then we conclude in Chapter 7.
This thesis tries to adhere to the terminologies and definitions in [7].
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2 Elements of real-time software
recovery
2.1 Characteristics of real-time recovery
In order for real-time systems to be robust, all the error handling and recov-
ery must be finished before deadlines. Although eventual recovery may be
acceptable for non-real-time systems, it is in fact incorrect behavior for real-
time systems. While this extra burden of timing exists, it also acts as clear
execution boundaries within which the system can exercise more flexibility.
Consider availability of systems. For general purpose systems, a system
with 99.999% uptime is considered as a highly available system. This number
is translated roughly to 5 minutes of aggregated down time per year. Consis-
tently limiting the downtime to under 5 minutes per year is not a trivial task.
It involves a lot of testing, verification, and a heavy application of runtime
fault-tolerance techniques in every part of the system.
Recovery Oriented Computing focuses on reducing MTTR in an attempt
to more efficiently improve availability. In [19], Candea gives the following
argument:
Availability =
MTTF
(MTTF + MTTR)
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and
lim
MTTR→0
(Availability) = 100%
The availability can be improved by either increasing MTTF or decreasing
MTTR. Obtainling a longer MTTF means a higher degree of perfection in de-
velopment. Minimizing MTTR, on the other hand, is directly related to how
recovery methods are designed and how the software is designed to accom-
modate the methods. Minimizing MTTR is especially appreciated because
the availability can be improved even if we do not have any control over
MTTF. This is often the case when COTS components are involved. How-
ever, no matter how hard we may try, obtaining MTTR of 0, thus reaching
the availability of 1, is unlikely.
The situation is somewhat different for real-time systems. Real-time sys-
tems have an additional constraint, deadline. As long as deadlines are met
and the results are acceptable, the system will be regarded as “working cor-
rectly,” regardless of what is going on between the deadlines. If a real-time
system is guaranteed to recover from any failure and produce acceptable re-
sults before deadlines, the availability will be 1. Suppose a task is running
alone in a real-time environment and its worst execution time and the dead-
line (= period) is 1 and 3 seconds respectively. Suppose further that the task
crashes near the end of its execution without generating output, and even-
tually produces a valid output after being immediately restarted, resulting 2
seconds of execution instead of 1 second. Even though the execution involves
a crash and recovery, the task meets its deadline and produces a valid result,
meeting all the real-time requirements. In terms of service availability, de-
spite the failure, it has been available 100% of time. This unique property of
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real-time systems allows us to plan for very high availability.
However, it does not mean that building reliable real-time systems is
easier. In order to achieve the desired improvement for real-time systems,
there are certain conditions to be met.
• Fast and predictable detection and recovery mechanism. As it is de-
sirable to make everything predictable in real-time systems, recovery
actions must also be predictable. Short execution times for such mech-
anisms are preferred, because shorter WCETs (Worst Case Execution
Time) will lower the recovery overhead and make it possible to achieve
higher processor utilization. Although detection mechanisms may not
be able to detect and isolate all faults immediately, it will be acceptable
if the symptoms or failures caused by faults are detected and corrected
in time.
• Reasonable coverage of detection methods In order for a system to be
robust, the detection coverage must be broad enough to catch most
of common errors so that they do not propagate further. Some errors
may be very hard to detect in time. In these cases, the method must
translate the faults and their manifestation into another domain or
detect them before the system behavior becomes unacceptable.
In the following sections, more detailed discussions on these issues will be
presented.
2.1.1 Fast and predictable detection and recovery
Restart is a widely used technology for achieving high availability in gen-
eral purpose computing. Advancements such as recursive restart [18] and
fault avoidance techniques like software rejuvenation [40] have successfully
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extended this technique for many more applications. For example, software
rejuvenation techniques have been used not only for proprietary in-house
software development, but also have been adopted for general-purpose sys-
tems such as IBM xSeries servers [21]. Restart technique has also been used
in soft real-time systems such as telecommunication systems and manufac-
turing systems [16] where the temporary interruption of service is undesirable
but acceptable.
Real-time embedded systems with hard deadlines pose a unique challenge
in applying these recovery and prevention techniques. Their requirements
are not limited to successfully detecting failures and restarting, but further
demand the recovery to be efficient and predictable. For example, it is not
reasonable to prescribe a simple shutdown and reboot remedy to the critical
control systems. Real-time systems require real-time recovery.
Predictable and fast recovery mechanism is needed to allow the design-
ers to reason about how the system will meet its timing requirements under
failure-recovery scenarios. With the techniques like generalized rate mono-
tonic analysis (GRMA) [78], the predictable overhead of recovery can be
treated as a blocking time, thus one can make sure the system meets its
real-time requirements even under recoverable failure conditions.
While predictability is one of the most distinguishing properties of any
real-time recovery mechanism, devising such a mechanism is non-trivial due
to difficulties in figuring the worst-case execution time (WCET) of the recov-
ery procedure. Complex real-time systems typically consist of the real-time
operating system, possibly some middleware and the application. It is not
easy to acquire the worst-case execution time of the recovery activity. Most
static methods will not be applicable in the presence of a complex mod-
ern processor and a 3rd party kernel with assembly code. What remains is
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Figure 2.1: Dimensions of real-time recovery
measurement-based estimation, whose correctness is heavily dependent on
the coverage of the test cases [47]. We will discuss how we can apply the
recovery mechanism with good estimated WCET for hard real-time systems.
In addition to predictability, high efficiency is another desired feature for
the embedded systems. Since such systems often leave not much room af-
ter performing normal duties, any recovery mechanism for small embedded
systems with limited resources should not incur large processing or storage
overhead. As a result, it is common to find a special customization of appli-
cations and commands in such embedded systems. However, since most soft-
ware reliability and software fault tolerance techniques have targeted much
larger scale applications and services, there are few or no tools that meet the
need of real-time embedded systems.
Failure-restart mechanisms have long been implemented and used at the
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hardware level. It has been commonly used even for non computer-related
devices. For computers, the most common low-level form is the watchdog
timer. For example, embedded microcontrollers like Atmel ATMega 128 have
a built-in watchdog timer, which resets itself when the system fails to respond
to the event properly. While this is effective in detecting system-wide crashes
or hangs, extending its use to deal with specific applications is difficult.
The software heartbeat or periodic i-am-alive messages are the software
version of hardware watchdog timers. It is possible to use a software heart-
beat to detect a process crash and restart. In fact many restartable systems
including [18] use this technique. When its overhead is acceptable, it is a
simple but valuable tool for detecting crash failures and some hang condi-
tions. However for high frequency hard real-time applications, the overhead
can be too great.
QNX[37] and CHORUS/OS[1] support a restart of some subsystems and
applications just as many microkernel operating systems do. QNX also pro-
vides hooks to recover the low-level details in the fault-tolerant version of
system calls. Many other commercial embedded real-time operating systems
also support traditional n+1 redundancy or process hot-swapping, primarily
to work with hardware redundancy and fail-over.
Recursive restart [18] allows for a partial restart of the system with the
help of a restart tree. It also tries to minimize the recovery time by taking
the MTTF and MTTR values of components into account and dynamically
organizing the restart tree.
In standard error handling in C/C++ programming, setjmp() and longjmp()
have been widely used. setjmp() saves the state information, including the
processor registers, at the specific execution point where it was invoked. Any
subsequent longjmp() will restore that state information and the execution
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will resume at the saved execution point. While it is fast and indeed effective
for a certain class of failures, repeated use of this method can lead to soft-
ware aging such as resource leaks. This is also not effective if the application
terminates or hangs.
The concept of software restart has constantly been extended in the past
decade by software rejuvenation [41, 21]. To avoid software aging-related
errors, software rejuvenation resets a running process before the occurrence
of any failure. A considerable amount of research has been conducted on
modeling of the software system and its aging to efficiently determine when
to perform the rejuvenation [86].
Libft and watchd [40] offer monitoring and a reusable recovery facility for
restartable systems. For soft real-time systems with less resource constraints,
the latency of common monitoring may be acceptable.
Although there have been great number of researches conducted in restart
recovery, it is very rare to find anything directly related to real-time systems.
In the real-time research community, investigation has been done primarily
on the scheduling aspect of real-time software fault tolerance The recovery
scheduling issues were first systematically addressed and solved by Imprecise
Computation Model in [60], and recently it was further developed and ex-
tended by Liverato et al. in [58]. There are other important works, but we
will not delve into this subject as we are focusing on the system-level issues,
not scheduling issues.
The performance and the predictability are the most important factors to
consider in designing real-time systems. Recovery mechanisms, being part of
real-time systems, also need to be predictable and exhibit reasonable perfor-
mance. As a building block of robust real-time systems, we have developed
Process Resurrection, a fast real-time recovery mechanism. The details will
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be presented in Chapter 3.
2.1.2 Coverage of detection methods
Robust systems must have failure/error detection mechanisms with compre-
hensive coverage. For each and every possible failure mode in the system,
there must be corresponding detection mechanisms capable of spotting erro-
neous system conditions before system becomes unrecoverable. For real-time
systems, any unacceptable delay or fail-stop (hang, crash, etc.) can be trans-
lated to a deadline miss, a special case of timing errors. Given that resources
are partitioned and protected, this aggregates many failure modes and sim-
plifies the detection process. But not all systems can afford to miss a deadline
then recover.
For real-time hardware fault-tolerance, fault masking techniques such as
TMR (triple modular redundancy) has been used to prevent any deadline
miss. For software, we will also use a form of redundancy called analytic
redundancy [80]. In analytic redundancy, a small well-tested core component
implements the base minimum essential functions the system must provide.
One or more redundant components can provide more complex features that
are not fully tested or validated. By using carefully designed acceptance test,
the healthiness of the outputs from feature-rich components can be assessed.
It can be a simple range check with regard to the corresponding output from
the core component, or it can be as elaborate as LMI-based [12] safety tests
for control systems. The detection is immediate and faults are masked by
using the results from core components. Note that use of the results from
core components likely means degraded performance, since they lack features
or refinements for the sake of simplicity.
What about the coverage? The use of analytic redundancy is not just
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for fast detection and processing of timing failures. Since it tests the accept-
ability of outputs, content errors are also covered. Furthermore, it translates
timing errors to content errors. Absence or unupdated outputs are tested
against the results from core components, and the errors will be detected if
the test shows the results are unsafe. Given that the simple core compo-
nent is well tested and highly reliable and protected temporally and spatially
from potentially faulty components, analytic redundancy can take care of
just about any software errors.
VEER utilizes analytic redundancy in order to maximize the coverage
of failure detection on critical real-time components. We have designed an
efficient analytic redundancy framework for embedded systems. The details
are shown in Chapter 4.
2.2 Fault containment and protection
Detection of and recovery from faults and failures are meaningless if faults
are propagated through unexpected paths to other components. While mak-
ing components work correctly is the most important task in achieving a
high dependability, designing components less susceptible to faults also help
control erroneous conditions. Hence having robust system components helps
enhancing fault containment.
2.2.1 Robustness in real-time software
Robustness is defined as “dependability with respect to external faults” [7].
Robust systems are resilient and resistant to unexpected or incorrect external
events. When we apply this concept to smaller entities that makes up a
system, we call it modular robustness.
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Modular robustness protects components from contaminated by external
faults including incorrect inputs and prevents further propagation of faults
(i.e. fault-containment). On the contrary, fragile systems or components lack
extensive and active handling of unexpected events, so they become reliant
on non-persistent conditions such as network connections, remote service
availability, etc. It is very easy to end up with a fragile system if the designer
assumes everything will work as planned. Robust systems are capable of
withstanding or handling unexpected events and continue to function at an
acceptable level of performance. Additionally, robust real-time embedded
software must deal with the unexpected conditions in timely manner with
limited resources.
One of the key concept in preventing fault-contamination is Use and
Depend. While any communication of data between two components results
in a dependency in the traditional sense, it is syntactic level dependency.
In semantic level, there may be no real dependency in terms of functional
reliance for acceptable execution. In this case we call it Use relationship.
If a component is actually functionally relying on the other component for
producing acceptable outputs, we call is Depend relationship. This concept
has been used informally for many years, but recently there was an attempt
to formally define these using failure semantics mappings [29].
2.2.2 Protection and Partitioning in Recovery
The level of protection between runtime units varies from one architecture to
another. The ideal architecture for robust real-time systems must provide i)
strong isolation in both temporal and spacial dimensions with a low overhead,
and ii) ways to control the allocation of time and space in predictable manner.
Software components must be protected from each other in terms of time
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and space. Even if one task overruns or falls into an infinite loop, other tasks
must be able to use the promised share of processor time. This property
is maintained by real-time task schedulers. Similarly, when a task exceeds
an array boundary and tries to overwrite a memory area that belongs to
another task, it should be detected immediately and not be allowed. This
is commonly done by a virtual memory manager with a hardware memory
management unit (MMU). These are what most of modern operating systems
offer, but the degree of isolation provided by these operating systems is not
sufficient. For example, if a task is preempted during a system call, the OS
state presented to the next task can be inconsistent and is difficult to prove
that the inconsistent portion of the OS state space does not affect other tasks.
For stronger isolation and protection, use of a virtual machine architec-
ture is desired [44]. Since it is meant to provide each of multiple software
systems with an illusion of being the sole user of its own physical machine,
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the greatest partitioning is also provided. The strong partitioning between
healthy and failing tasks, and also between critical and non-critical tasks
will make the interactions between tasks explicit and clearly visible. This is
a very important property for enforcing Use relationship between tasks with
varying degrees of criticality.
If a virtual machine running on top of a real-time virtual machine monitor
is guaranteed to get a predefined amount of CPU time in a specific time
interval, CPU usage changes outside the virtual machine activation period
will not affect it in any way. This is achieved by the combination of temporal
and spacial partitioning and isolation. When a failure of a critical task occurs,
we can choose from several different recovery mechanisms and possibly assign
more time slots for faster recovery to meet the end-to-end deadline. One
extreme scenario is that when a critical component needs to be recovered
urgently and the CPU time “reserve” is not enough, we can pick one of non-
critical component and take allocated CPU time away to assign it to the
recovery activity. By employing a synchronous and configurable top-level
scheduler for virtual machine scheduling, we can safely achieve this without
affecting any other tasks.
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3 Fast Restart Recovery
In this chapter, we demonstrate how one can build an efficient and predictable
recovery mechanism for real-time embedded systems with limited resources.
We have developed Process Resurrection, a restart mechanism, with which
an application can be made to automatically restart on crash failures. The
restart can also be initiated on demand to provide software rejuvenation or
upgrades. We applied this technique to the inverted pendulum control system
and an mp3 audio playback software. We also show how to incorporate the
measurement-based WCET estimation of Process Resurrection to hard real-
time systems
3.1 Architecture
For efficiency and performance, the recovery mechanism should introduce
only a small amount of additional code to the system. It translates to a low
API Description
r initialize() Set up a handler for the specified signals
and register user defined pre-processor
r malloc() Allocate the specified size of state stor-
age
r free() Deallocate the state storage
r pthread mutex lock() BCP-enabled lock (optional)
r pthread mutex trylock() BCP-enabled trylock (optional)
r pthread mutex unlock() BCP-enabled unlock (optional)
Table 3.1: Process Resurrection Functions
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Signal Description
SIGFPE Erroneous arithmetic operation.
SIGILL Illegal instruction.
SIGSEGV Invalid memory reference.
SIGBUS Access to an undefined portion of a memory object.
SIGSYS Bad system call.
SIGXCPU CPU time limit exceeded.
SIGXFSZ File size limit exceeded.
Table 3.2: POSIX Signals used for notification of impending crash.
run-time overhead and storage requirement. We have achieved this goal by
utilizing features already existing in the operating system and the processor.
Table 3.1 lists the functions provided by Process Resurrection.
3.1.1 Crash Detection in Operating System
The crash detection in Process Resurrection is directly linked to the crash
detection mechanism of the processor and the operating system. Unix-like
operating systems offer signals as an event notification mechanism. They
are used for normal events like job control (SIGINT, SIGTSTP, SIGKILL,
SIGCONT, etc.) as well as for the notification of an abnormal state de-
tected by the hardware or the operating system. Among those error noti-
fication signals, the most common one is segmentation fault (SIGSEGV).
Others in this class include bus error (SIGBUS) from address misalignment,
arithmetic operation error (SIGFPE) like divide by zero, and execution of
an illegal instruction(SIGILL). Table 3.2 lists the signals used for erroneous
event notification.
These signals notify the offending process of fatal errors that will make
it no longer operational. Even if the signal is handled, the behavior after re-
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turning from the signal handler is undefined in POSIX. Nevertheless, on most
Unix-like operating systems, the process will be terminated after returning
from the handler. This form of termination is commonly called application
crash.
Although one can assign a custom signal handler for most of the signals,
the crash signals are usually not directly linked to a recovery action. Instead
of using special user-level handlers, it is common practice to simply use the
default signal handler for such signals, which cleans itself up, dumps core if
possible and exits. Some applications try to display user-friendly messages
or launch quality feedback software.
Instead of terminating, Process Resurrection uses these crash-related sig-
nals to initiate the application recovery. They have not only an excellent
coverage of process crash failures, but also a very short delay between fault
occurrence and its notification: a quality favorable to the recovery of real-
time embedded systems.
The operating system also notifies applications of non-fatal errors in the
form of the return value of system calls. These values and exceptions must be
checked and handled by the application. Without comprehensive handling of
such conditions, the application may exit unexpectedly or eventually cause
crash failures that may happen repeatedly even after restarting.
3.1.2 Triggering the Recovery
The common way of automating restart is to have an external monitor pe-
riodically check the status of the process and launch the process again if
a crash is detected. While this technique is widely used for non-real-time
applications, its run-time overhead and fault detection latency is too much
for real-time embedded systems. To reduce the fault detection latency for a
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control system, one may have to check the process for every control loop. If
not checked frequently enough, an overlooked crash will delay the recovery
and miss the deadline. This is the reason why fault notification signals are
used in our system instead of monitoring.
The signals are very efficient recovery triggers; in Linux there is no normal
case run-time overhead and the operating system activates the signal handler,
through do signal() kernel function, only when a failure occurs.
In Process Resurrection, we assign a special signal handler for every crash-
related signal to trigger the recovery. The application developer may choose
to ignore or assign handlers to some of the non-fatal signals whose default
action is to terminate the process. If some of these signals are used for normal
execution, the signal mask must be set up correctly in order for the process
to handle the normal signals, even after a recovery.
A recovery is triggered when one of the crash signals is delivered to the
process. Once the operating system sends the signal to the process, the
registered handler will be executed instead of returning to the preempted
point. Inside the custom signal handler, the following tasks are performed:
• Do any user-defined pre-processing.
• Gather the state information to transfer, if necessary.
• Replace (execve()) the process image with its own or an alternative
and transfer the state information.
When the process image of the offending process is replaced in the last
step, all the locally held resources of the offending process will be automati-
cally released by the operating system. This is a desired property for dealing
with software aging-related failures. The shared resources, on the other hand,
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may require special handling, as other processes may expect the resources
to be in a certain state. Since the image of the offending process is consid-
ered corrupt, any complex clean-up action on the shared resources may lead
to another critical error. For this reason, such actions are taken after the
replacement.
Application-specific recovery action is selected based on the information
transferred when replacing the process image. Such information is propa-
gated in the form of arguments when invoking the execve() system call.
For example, when the control process crashes in our inverted pendulum
control system, we transfer the information, such as sensor calibration data,
in this way. The techniques for transferring more complex information are
explained in the next section.
The replaced process image need not be of the same process. One can
choose to replace the current process image with an alternative image. It is
useful when a process repeatedly fails, one resurrection after another. The
user can set a limit on the number of consecutive resurrections and specify an
alternative version that will be used when the recovery reaches the limit. This
feature can also be used for non-failure conditions such as reconfiguration or
upgrade.
The process replacement of this form is very efficient. The restart is
immediate and the binary loading time is often significantly reduced when
the system is equipped with a fast and large cache. Since the process retains
its process id, unlike the terminate-and-restart method, some of the restart
dependencies between processes can also be reduced.
In our system, the r initialize() function allows users to specify which
signals to be associated with the Process Resurrection signal handler. Users
can also define custom pre-processing and post-processing for the recovery.
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However, some system functions, including mutex operations, are not async-
signal safe, meaning that use of such functions in a signal handler may cause
unexpected results, including deadlock. POSIX guarantees certain functions
to be async-signal-safe. The user-defined pre-processing routine must use
only such system calls as listed in Table 3.3.
3.1.3 Persistent Storage and State Transfer
Process Resurrection can be used with number of existing checkpointing
mechanisms. However, the conventional way of accessing persistent stor-
age (i.e. a disk) may not be desirable to real-time embedded systems due
to its slow speed and long blocking effect. To overcome this, memory-based
persistent storage is provided for storing local state information. The lifetime
can be as long as that of the operating system. Since we are interested in
process-level recovery, such a degree of persistency is sufficient.
The memory-based persistent storage was implemented using shared mem-
ory. On Linux, shared memory is allocated from the kernel memory space
and then is mapped to the virtual address space of a user space process. Once
mapped, the access involves no system call or context switch. Furthermore,
it will not be paged out, as the paging on the allocated region will be dis-
abled when created. The shared memory is preserved even after the creator
process has crashed. Unless the system call that destroys the shared memory
is explicitly issued, it will remain until the operating system reboots.
The resurrected processes can remap the shared memory region to its ad-
dress space after recovery, at a very low cost. The way the state information
is retrieved can be dictated by the combination of the argument given at the
time of image replacement and the predefined protocol by the user.
The persistent storage can be allocated by calling the r malloc() func-
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exit() fstat() read()
sysconf() access() getegid()
rename() tcdrain() alarm()
geteuid() rmdir() tcflow()
cfgetispeed() getgid() setgid()
tcflush() cfgetospeed() getgroups()
setpgid() tcgetattr() cfsetispeed()
getpgrp() setsid() tcgetpgrp()
cfsetospeed() getpid() setuid()
tcsendbreak() chdir() getppid()
sigaction() tcsetattr() chmod()
getuid() sigaddset() tcsetpgrp()
chown() kill() sigdelset()
time() close() link()
sigemptyset() times() creat()
lseek() sigfillset() umask()
dup2() mkdir() sigismember()
uname() dup() mkfifo()
sigpending() unlink() execle()
open() sigprocmask() utime()
execve() pathconf() sigsuspend()
wait() fcntl() pause()
sleep() waitpid() fork()
pipe() stat() write()
Table 3.3: Async-Signal Safe Functions
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tion that returns the pointer to the storage of requested size. It is rarely
necessary but the allocated persistent storage can be deallocated using the
r free() function. Once allocated, the storage can be used in the same
way the local variables are used, but it is recommended that users define a
structure to organize the storage.
Our recovery mechanism has no support for checkpointing [40] to save
and restore the complete application state. This is because our target appli-
cation domain is primarily real-time applications that require simple state
restoration. Some applications may have soft states, which the process can
reacquire or approximate after the recovery. For the inverted pendulum con-
trol, for example, the pendulum’s angle and track position are reacquired at
every period, so losing the current input is of no concern. The essential state
information includes the device-specific calibration data that can be obtained
only at the initial state of the pendulum. The filtering history is an example
of a soft state. Even if the filtering history is lost, the filter will again be
stabilized after a number of control loop executions. Another reason why we
do not provide a generic checkpointing facility is that it is less effective than
application-specific methods [22].
However, some state information cannot be transferred by using only the
application level mechanisms. For example, TCP connection information will
be stored in the kernel, and it will be lost after the process is reinitialized.
To reconstruct the communication channel with no changes in the kernel, an
application-specific user-level recovery protocol must be used. The kernel-
level monitoring and logging such as FT-TCP [4] can also be used in con-
junction with Process Resurrection to provide a transparent communication
channel recovery. The same design principle applies to the non-persistent
IPC mechanisms.
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During the resurrection, all normal activities including communication,
computation, and normal signal handling will be suppressed. If the com-
munication peer tries to communicate with the process being resurrected,
the message will be either blocked or discarded. After the completion of the
resurrection, the communication channel may be destroyed if it is a non-
persistent one. Thus the application should be able to anticipate such an
outage and to reconstruct the channel.
For easier recovery, use of an asynchronous state-less protocol is preferred.
However, low-level communication semantics should not be more restrictive
than application level semantics, in order to minimize extra effort for recov-
ery. For example, if the high-level application semantics allows a message to
be lost, the low-level communication can be UDP-based without any explicit
recovery mechanism. Using TCP for such an application will involve addi-
tional exception handling code to make it restartable. For applications with
synchronous communication semantics, a synchronous low-level communi-
cation mechanism like TCP will be more suitable. To make it restartable,
however, additional application-level exception handling and recovery are re-
quired. One can, of course, use a transparent recovery solution like FT-TCP.
3.1.4 Preventing Unbounded Priority Inversion
In priority scheduling-based systems, multiple tasks that share resources may
exhibit unbounded priority inversion, a lengthy blocking of a higher priority
task by a lower priority one. To help make the system more predictable, a
user-level call wrapper for locking and unlocking is also provided. Inside the
wrapper, a priority inversion [77] avoidance technique similar to the priority
ceiling protocol is implemented. If the underlying operating system supports
a priority inversion avoidance protocol, the native locking and unlocking calls
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can be used directly.
The protocol raises the priority of calling process to the predefined re-
source priority that is higher than that of any normal process. When there
are only those tasks that belong to one resource-sharing group, the maximum
blocking time will be identical to the priority ceiling protocol. However, un-
der more complex scenarios, a high priority task may be blocked by the
duration of an unrelated critical section. However, users are allowed to over-
ride the predefined fixed resource priority in order to implement the ceiling
protocol.
3.1.5 Predictability of Process Resurrection
Since most of Process Resurrection consists of system calls, the timing anal-
ysis has to deal with the kernel code execution, which is not easily achievable
with static analysis methods. The difficulty of obtaining a precise WCET
using static methods lies in the very nature of kernel code; it includes as-
sembly code, it is complex, and optimization is heavily used. As a result,
we settled for a conservative WCET value and extend the deadline using
Kalman filter if the actual WCET exceeds the estimate. This technique has
been demonstrated in more complex control systems such as [34].
In the next section, we will show a control system with a tight budget as
an application.
3.2 Experiments
We have implemented an inverted pendulum control system (Figure 3.1)
and an MP3 audio player that can recover from crash failures using the
Process Resurrection technique. For demonstration purposes, they only deal
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Figure 3.1: The inverted pendulum control system
with segmentation faults, but they can be made to recover from other crash
failures by registering the trigger handler for other types of crash-related
signals. In addition to a crash failure recovery scenario, Process Resurrection
is applied to a software rejuvenation of the Telelab system, a remote control
laboratory that allows on-line upgrades of the control software.
3.2.1 Inverted Pendulum Control
The inverted pendulum control system is used to demonstrate the agility
of Process Resurrection. This control system is inherently instable. Even
when the angle error and angular velocity are small, several missed control
outputs can make the pendulum fall. When the pendulum is tilted past a
certain angle, an even one missing control outputs can lead the pendulum
to crash. Due to this strict timing requirement, the detection of control
software’s crash and recovery from the crash must be carried out in a timely
and predictable manner.
The control computer is based on AMD’s 133 MHz E´lan SC520 processor,
which is an 80486-grade processor with 66 MHz memory bus. It has 16 KB
of level 1 cache on chip, but no level 2 cache is present on the board. The
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computer is equipped with the quadrature encoder interface for sensing input
and a digital to analog converter for control output. It runs the Linux kernel
with RT scheduling and kernel preemption enhancements. While the kernel
is being loaded, the compressed root file system image in the flash memory
is decompressed to the ram disk. So the file system accesses following the
boot process are indeed main memory accesses.
Single Control Process
In its normal operation mode, the control process acquires sensor inputs for
the angle and the track position, and then calculates the control command
that is subsequently sent to the D/A converter. The control frequency is 50
Hz. In other words, these operations are repeatedly performed every 20 ms.
It means that the fault detection, notification, recovery, and re-execution of
the control software must be finished in less than 20 ms, in order to avoid
missing any control output.
To meet this timing requirement, Process Resurrection is used. When a
SIGSEGV signal is delivered and the process is about to crash, the recovery
handler preempts normal execution of the control software. The handler
will then initiate the replacement of the process image using an execve()
system call. As an argument to the system call, the device calibration data
is transferred in order to prevent the resurrected process from erratically
calibrating the device again at the non-initial plant state. In most cases,
this is enough to maintain control, but a more seamless recovery requires
additional data, such as the history concerning the input-filtering algorithm.
Since this information consists of a number of floating point variables, it is
written to the already created persistent storage with r malloc(). Once the
operating system initializes the resurrected process, the process will examine
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Case 1 Case 2
Avg. fault interval 510 ms 20 ms
Range 20 - 1000 ms 10 ms - 30 ms
With deadline extension no effect little jitter
With full dependency very jittery unstable
Table 3.4: Results of simple fault injection. Each case ran for 1 hour. The
unstable case didn’t complete the 1-hour run.
the arguments to main() and recover the state information stored in the
persistent storage.
In order to see how the recovery affects the schedulability, the execution
times were measured using an additional 8254-based programmable interval
timer on the I/O board. The resolution of the timer is 125 ns. As shown in
Table 3.5, the time it takes to notify the process of the impending crash (i.e.
signal delivery) is 38 µs in the worst case. The time spent on replacing the
process image and loading the state information is 11.2 ms in the worst case.
The standard deviation is smaller than the one measured on the Pentium
III 1.2 GHz machine, mainly because it lacks the level 2 cache. Since the
control itself takes 25.75 µs, the entire recovery and normal execution time is
under 12 ms, which is far less than our 20 ms of budget. In this case, even a
very conservative WCET estimation can be accommodated. For details see
Table 3.5.
Limited Budget
The situation, however, changes when we have more than one process and
a tighter loop. In eSimplex [59] systems, multiple versions of controllers
are running. The semantic error monitor with a safety controller ensures
the stability of the plant, even if an untrusted controller is uploaded as an
upgrade. Although the user controller is still running with 20 ms period, the
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deadline is 10 ms, because the control commands from trusted and untrusted
controllers must be checked for safety by the eSimplex core task, a higher
priority job, before outputting the chosen command to the actuator by the
end of the 20 ms period.
From the previous measurements, we estimated the WCET to be 12ms,
giving about 6 % of over-estimation. With this WCET, the crash detection
and recovery will not fit in the budget of 10 ms. When the user controller
crashes, it will miss the deadline after recovery. Although the system can
maintain stability in the presence of an occasional deadline miss, frequent
misses will surely bring the system down. In TableIV, the effect of frequent
misses is shown. The test was conducted with two different failure rates and
each case ran for one hour with the exception of one case, which crashed
within seconds. 1 When the crash is uniformly distributed between 10 and
30 ms, the control will fail to maintain the stability of the inverted pendulum.
Even if the failure rate is significantly smaller, the control performance will
be noticeably degraded.
The control failure or performance degradation is due to the tight deadline
in the system. When the control process misses deadline, it is preempted by
the higher priority task, breaking the timing dependency between the con-
troller and the sensor. To solve this problem, a Kalman filter is used to
extend the deadline. The Kalman filter will smooth out any sudden changes
in the input values that are unusual in continuous physical systems. The im-
proved performance is shown in Table 3.4. Under the same stress conditions,
the system with a weakened dependency performs significantly better. Even
in a high failure rate scenario, it maintains stability instead of failing. When
1The video clip of the experiment are available at
http://www-rtsl.cs.uiuc.edu/pr/
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Figure 3.2: Using alternative process image
the failure rate is lower, the crash failures exhibit no perceivable effect on
the quality of the control.
The deadline extension involves a state transfer to the resurrected process.
The filter data structure is stored in the persistent storage and the resurrected
process continues to use the data for filtering. The addition of persistent
storage incurs one page (4 KB) of additional memory overhead and a small
initial setup time, which is in the order of microseconds in our configuration.
No normal case run-time overhead is added. When the estimated WCET
based on measurements is close to the time budget, we can apply the same
deadline extension techniques to minimize the effect of budget overrun.
Using an Alternative
Process Resurrection can also replace the process image with an alternative.
In an inverted control system, the pendulum may be stable enough to be
controlled even after one missed period. If we are allowed to miss one dead-
line, we can afford to have more than one crash failure in a period. It is
useful when the controller repeatedly crashes in the current system state.
See Figure 3.2. Suppose the control process started at time 0 and crashes at
time 25 µs, at nearly the end of its execution. The process will then be res-
urrected at 25 µs + 38 µs + 11.2 ms = 11.263 ms. However, it crashes again
after 25 µs just like the first time. If we resurrect the process again, the next
execution will complete at around 22.551 ms. Since we are allowed to miss
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at most only one deadline, it will not be a problem. However, if the freshly
resurrected process fails again for the third time, it is very probable that
the subsequently resurrected process will also fail. For this reason, we allow
setting the limit on the number of resurrections per user defined period. The
limit is set to two per 30 ms in this example. Suppose, at time 22.551 ms,
the second resurrected process crashes. Since we have set the limit to two, it
will be replaced with another version, which is the last known working ver-
sion. As shown in Table 3.5, replacing with a different process image takes a
little longer, 12.3 ms. As a result, the third resurrection will be completed at
34.889 ms. Assuming the execution time of the alternative version is 31 µs,
which is not significantly longer than the original version, the computation
will end by 34.92 ms, well before the second deadline, 40 ms. Accordingly,
the version switching prevented a possibly endless resurrection cycle due to
a critical bug in the original control software.
3.2.2 MP3 Audio Player
We have also applied the Process Resurrection technique to an MP3 audio
player. In fact, the original mp3 player we modified is a sufficiently mature
application. Thus, we artificially injected faults to demonstrate how the tech-
nique would work with such an application. Although such an application is
considered as soft real-time at best, reducing perceivable disruption is also
desirable in the recovery.
The audio player chosen is mpg123 version 0.59r. We have modified the
source code to apply our technique. As in the previous example, a segmen-
tation fault will trigger the process image to be reinitialized. Between the
resurrections, the name of the mp3 file being played and the location inside
the file at the time of crash are transferred.
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Even with no real-time support of the operating system and no optimiza-
tion for reducing the initialization time after recovery, the perceived sound
quality degradation was small. 2 If the application is further modified to
reduce the recovery time, it may be possible to have no loss in the sound
quality. However, for simplicity we simply added a recovery handler and a
simple state transfer using the arguments to the system call.
When the segmentation fault was injected roughly every 5 seconds, the
player recovered and continued to play the music. Although we have not ap-
plied any dependency weakening technique, the effect of disruption is reduced
by the buffer in the sound card, which can hold several hundred milliseconds
worth of sound data at the sampling rate of 44.1 KHz. The buffering is also
a known timing dependency weakening measure. Since the buffer resides on
separate hardware and is not destroyed by the process restart, it has property
of timed persistency. Thus if we recover and feed the buffer before it runs
out, there will be no perceivable disruption in the sound quality.
3.2.3 Software Rejuvenation
The Telelab [59] is a remote control experiment system that allows users
to upgrade the control software on the fly and to monitor the effect of the
upgrade. The underlying Simplex architecture [80] detects semantics, timing,
and execution errors of the control system before the defects of the new
software break the control.
Although the control is never compromised thanks to the Simplex archi-
tecture, the additional services that interface the system with a user may
show signs of aging after many upgrade requests are carried out. In the be-
2The recording of the experiment is available at
http://www-rtsl.cs.uiuc.edu/pr/
39
Action AMD SC520
133MHz (486)
Intel Pentium III
1.2GHz
control calculation 24.51µs (0.54)
25.75µs
3.03µs (0.35)
3.74µs
execve()-self 10.7ms (0.11)
11.2ms
601µs (19.98)
680µs
execve()-other 11.7ms (0.18)
12.3ms
980µs (22.55)
1078µs
fork() 409µs
454µs
158µs
166µs
signal
delivery
37.15µs (0.35)
38.0µs
6.0µs (1.19)
8.12µs
Table 3.5: Measured execution times. Average (std deviation) and worst
case are shown.
ginning, a periodic rebooting of the system is in place, but it would become
unavailable if an unusually high number of requests were made during the
reset period. This actually occurred when a large number of people accessed
the system as a class project near the end of semester. Rather than fixing
the complex distributed software, a software rejuvenation technique was used
with the help of Process Resurrection.
In the new system, an external monitor keeps track of the number of
upgrade requests made and of clients connected. When the numbers reach
a predefined threshold, a signal is sent to some of the processes constituting
the system in a certain order. Each process in the system is modified using
our technique, so that they can be quickly restarted upon reception of the
signal from the monitor. Since the system is now refreshed based on a more
relevant aging factor and the restart is fast, the availability of the experiment
system has been greatly improved.
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CPU Speed (MHz) Cache Repl.
Pentium III 1200 512K L2 1.07 ms
Pentium III 1000 256K L2 0.82ms
Pentium III 733 256K L2 1.60 ms
AMD K-6 II 533 256K L2 1.77 ms
UltraSparc Iii 360 256K L2 4.50 ms
AMD SC520 133 n/a 12.3 ms
Table 3.6: Image replacement times
3.3 Performance
The values shown in Table 3.5 were measured under the typical system load.
For the embedded computer, the control software was running at a higher pri-
ority level and occasional UDP-based traffic was present. The measurement
was performed using the RDTSC instruction on Pentiums and AMD K-6 II.
For UltraSparc, the gethrtimer() function of Solaris was used. Finally for
AMD SC520, which lacks native timing measurement support, an additional
hardware with an 8254 timer was used. The computer with UltraSparc was
running Sun Solaris 7 and others were running GNU/Linux.
3.3.1 Replacement Time
The fault-detection to signal delivery time was relatively short when com-
pared to the time to finish execve(). Since execve() involves accessing the
file, it will take much longer than a straightforward execution of the kernel
code. With a fast and large L2 cache on the Pentium III Tualatin processor,
the image reloading time (680 µs) is much shorter than the time to load other
uncached images (1078 µs). The difference is much smaller on the embedded
computer (10.7 ms Vs. 11.2 ms) that has no level 2 cache.
The measured values for using execve() to replace its own with an alter-
native image are shown in TableVI. It shows that when loading an uncached
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image, the processor speed is not the dominant factor in timing. Since the
replacement involves uncached data access from the file system, the relatively
long disk access speed will determine how soon it finishes. In fact the 1200
Mhz machine was slower than a 1000 Mhz machine with an even larger cache.
It is because the 1200 Mhz machine has a slower disk subsystem (hdparm -t
value of 20.98 MB/s) while the 1000 Mhz system (hdparm -t value of 52.03
MB/s) is equipped with Ultra 160 SCSI controllers and disks. AMD SC520,
the control computer in our inverted pendulum experiment, avoids a possibly
much longer execution time by keeping the file system in the ram disk.
3.3.2 Storage Requirment
The use of Process Resurrection with simple or no state transfer adds very
little extra code and data. The binary size of the original inverted pendulum
control is 14,871 bytes unstripped, and the resurrection-enabled version is
15,148 bytes, adding only 277 bytes. When the binaries are stripped, the
difference is only 20 bytes.
The control computer’s persistent storage is based on a small flash mem-
ory, where the kernel and root image are stored. Adding 20 bytes to the root
image is not considered as an overhead in almost all cases.
3.3.3 Processor Overhead
The extra execution time of the recovery mechanism is added only when
there is a crash. Assuming the time between crashes is reasonably long for
well-tested systems, the overall run-time overhead is very small. If periodic
monitoring is to be used instead, run-time overhead will be present even
when there is no failure. In our system, most of the remaining CPU time
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Figure 3.3: Replacement time when using alternative process image
can be used for other non real-time jobs or soft real-time applications.
For different types of applications, the actual recovery time will vary be-
cause the post-processing after the process image replacement is application-
dependent. If the application is stateless or only has soft-states, the post-
processing will be minimal. If the application requires large dynamic re-
sources, the initialization may take a long time, adding even more time for
recovery to become ready.
In the inverted pendulum case, there is a little overhead for setting up the
necessary persistent storage and the signal handler in the very first execution
in the system initialization phase. The time-consuming memory allocation
for persistent storage is not present in any subsequent resurrection. After the
initialization, each resurrected process will simply attach itself to the already
existing storage using one simple system call.
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3.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we presented Process Resurrection, an efficient recovery mech-
anism for real-time embedded systems. The time between fault detection and
the recovery initiation is very short, and recovery overhead is only incurred
when there actually is a crash failure. This ensures that there is minimum
overhead for recovery and the remaining processing power can be used for
soft or non real-time applications.
We have applied this technique to the inverted pendulum control to show
how quickly it can recover from crash failures occurring at a very high rate.
The recovery was completed within 12 ms for the control process within a
20 ms minute period on our experimental platform. When implemented on
a faster processor like Intel Pentium III 1200 MHz, the whole recovery took
less than 700 µs.
When the timing budget is tight or the WCET of recovery is uncertain,
various dependency strength weakening methods can be used to extend the
deadline. In our example, the Kalman filter and the isolated buffer were used
to reduce the disturbance caused by the recovery actions.
It can also be used with other complementary techniques like software
rejuvenation [41, 86, 21] and checkpointing and logging [40]. Memory-based
persistent storage eliminates the overhead from accessing the disk-based per-
sistent storage. This memory region can easily be remapped at a low cost
after resurrection. The use of memory-based persistent storage was demon-
strated in the inverted pendulum control experiment. The storage can also
be shared by many processes or managed by external programs.
For some applications in a distributed environment, a transparent fast
recovery may be desirable. Such applications will be further benefited if a
44
restart-transparent communication mechanism is provided. Although Pro-
cess Resurrection currently leaves the communication channel recovery to
applications, the future plan includes support for such a mechanism in the
form of a library and API. Nevertheless, users will be allowed to use other
means of communication and design their own recovery mechanisms for the
channel.
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4 Expanding failure detection
coverage with eSimplex
eSimplex is a toolkit developed by this author for implementing analytic
redundancy on embedded real-time systems. Use of analytic redundancy
allows detection of content errors if a proper safety test can be designed
for the application. Since the check is performed at regular interval, timing
errors can also be detected.
Our goal is to meet the following requirements:
• Runtime efficiency. Real-time embedded systems are often limited in
computational and storage resources. It is unrealistic to have a mech-
anism that incurs huge runtime computation and storage overhead;
• Predictability. All activities of the system, including active components
and support systems, must be predictable, and their WCETs must be
known in order to guarantee their schedulability;
• Robustness. Updates must be dependable and should not violate run-
time requirements in terms of timing, execution, and semantics. If any
anomaly is detected, the system must be recovered in a predictable
2O (n )
High Assurance
Component
High Performance
Component
Quicksort BubblesortUnsortedList
Sorted
List
O (n log n)
Figure 4.1: Conceptual overview of Simplex
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Figure 4.2: The Simplex Architecture
manner;
• Applicability. The majority of embedded systems are still developed
in C/C++. Any dependability testing or upgrade system must be
compatible with the commonly used development environment.
4.1 Architecture
eSimplex is based on Simplex architecture [79]. Simplex architecture can
detect and tolerate timing, execution and content errors of user-supplied
software. Figure 4.1 is a conceptual illustration of the principle of this archi-
tecture. In this example, we are developing a sorting program. The critical
requirement is to sort the list in the correct order, and the optimization re-
quirement is to sort efficiently. We have an implementation of bubble sort,
which is logically simple and easier to implement, but the computational com-
plexity is O(n2). Suppose we can implement, with less confidence, a faster
but more complex sorting such as quick sort, whose computation complexity
is O(nlogn).
If we choose one implementation over the other, we would either lose
performance or accuracy. To do it in Simplex style, we first run the “newly
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developed” quick sort implementation, and then pass the results to the Bub-
ble Sort. If the list is sorted correctly by the new sorting program, bubble sort
will traverse the list in O(n) time, making the overall complexity O(nlogn),
otherwise it will correct the result in O(n2) time. In this way, we can ben-
efit from the features of the newly developed unproven component when it
works correctly, but still meet the critical requirement even if it does not, at
the cost of a degraded feature or performance. The key concepts illustrated
by this example are the notions of depend and use. The sorting system’s
correctness depends on the bubble sort. That is, if the bubble sort does not
sort correctly, it will produce an incorrect order. But the system only uses
the output of the unproven new sorting algorithm. The system will output
the correct order, even if the unproven new sorting algorithm produces an
incorrectly ordered list.
Figure 4.2 shows an outline of the actual architecture for real-time em-
bedded systems. In this architecture, a simple and verifiable core component
(e.g. bubble sort) performs the critical tasks. A feature rich but unreli-
able counterpart of the simple component is called the complex component
(e.g. quick sort). The complex component may have not been fully tested or
verified, and developers can submit one for on-line testing or dependable up-
grade. The physical I/O subsystem supplies input data (e.g. sensor readings)
to the simple and complex component. The heart of this architecture is the
decision logic, which checks not only the outputs from the complex compo-
nent, but, more importantly, whether the state of the plant stays within the
recovery region of the simple controller. This is because it is often impossible
to determine if an output from the complex component is correct without
examining how the system responds to the output. The system is normally
controlled by the complex component. The simple component will take over
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Figure 4.3: eSimplex: An implementation of Simplex for Embedded systems
if 1) the complex component generates an illegal output; 2) the system under
the control of complex controller performs poorly; 3) the system state un-
der the complex component approaches the boundary of the recovery region;
or 4) the process that runs the complex component fails. In the following
discussion, all but the complex components are called system components.
The keys to ensuring dependability of the system are:
• Isolation of the unproven complex component from the system compo-
nents. By isolation we mean that the unproven complex component is
in a separate partition, in time and space. For example, the misbehav-
ing complex component cannot exceed its execution budget or preempt
core components. It is also contained in a separate address space to
prevent corruption of core components’ memory content.
• The system components do not depend on the complex component, but
use its output if available and acceptable based on the decision logic
as described above.
4.2 Implementation of the Architecture
The architecture described in the previous section has been implemented to
prove its feasibility and to evaluate its real-time properties. For a dependable
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testing and upgrade subsystem, we chose to use eSimplex and modify it to
suit our purposes. eSimplex is an implementation of the Simplex architecture
for embedded systems. It was developed for the Linux operating system, but
can easily be ported to any POSIX-compliant Unix-like operating system.
Figure 4.3 shows the internals of eSimplex. The system core components and
the complex component reside in separate virtual memory address spaces.
Soft real-time, non-critical components such as status reporter and remote
control server also run as separate processes.
All communications between the processes are performed via the shared
memory region with the communication wrapper functions. The use of shared
memory has distinctive benefits in real-time embedded systems:
• Shared memory is allocated from the kernel memory, thus it can act as
a stable storage as long as the operating system does not fail;
• Once mapped to the local virtual address space, accessing shared mem-
ory does not involve any system call, unlike other IPC mechanisms.
Since it can be accessed in the application context, no context switch-
ing or memory copying is necessary for communication.
eSimplex enforces the Use relationship in the application semantics domain,
and with the help of the operating system’s fixed priority scheduler, isolation
in the timing domain is also provided. Isolation in the execution domain is
achieved by the operating system’s process-level protection and the use of
static compiler checks for memory safety [49].
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Component Role Characteristics
Simple Component Safe high assurance
component.
Real-time and criti-
cal
Decision Logic Check for safety and
detect content errors
of complex compo-
nent.
Real-time and criti-
cal
Process Manager Start or stop complex
component
Real-time
Physical I/O Send and receive
data from actuators
and sensors
Real-time and criti-
cal
Complex Component High performance
component submit-
ted by users
Real-time and non-
critical
Potentially buggy
Status Reporter Reports plant sta-
tus and control com-
mands to external
user interface
Soft real-time
Non-critical
Remote Control
Server
Allows complex com-
ponent to be up-
loaded.
It can also remove
complex component
per users request.
Non real-time
Non-critical
Table 4.1: Description of eSimplex components
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4.3 Experiments
For evaluation and analysis, we have implemented an inverted pendulum
control system on our architecture.
4.3.1 Inverted pendulum control system
The hardware platform for the control computer has an AMD E´lan SC520
embedded processor packaged in the PC/104 form factor. The second layer
of the system is a D/A converter for control command output to the actuator.
The last layer consists of a custom-made PC/104 sensor interface board for
optical quadrature encoders. The system has 64 MB of main memory, but the
operating system is allowed to use only 2MB, and 8MB is used for the RAM
disk. The system also has 16MB of flash memory for storing the operating
system kernel and the root file system image. For timing measurement, since
the processor lacks an on-chip cycle counter, an i8254-based timer on the
DA converter board was used. The operating system is Linux 2.2.18 with
real-time enhancements.
The inverted pendulum control is a periodic task running with a period
of 20 ms. When the system is in the testing and upgrade mode, the physical
I/O subsystem reads the sensor data for angle and track position. The input
data is used by the simple controller (or reliable controller), then the complex
controller to calculate the control command, which is the voltage to be sent to
the motor moving the cart. Before the deadline (20 ms after the beginning
of this period), decision logic performs an acceptance test on the results
from the complex controller. If the command is not acceptable, the complex
controller is no longer allowed to run. Details about the decision logic are
given in the next subsection.
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Figure 4.4: Standalone controller with physical I/O. (avg: 40.62 µs, stdev:
1.29, max: 45.13 µs)
4.3.2 Decision logic for inverted pendulum control
Decision logic is where the check against complex controller’s content errors
is performed. We can define an acceptable system state with a set of op-
erational constraints. The decision logic will take away the control from a
faulty complex controller and give it to the simple controller when the plant
state approaches the boundary of recovery region. The recovery region is
the largest stability envelope for the associated controller within the state
constraints. Mathematically, it is an n-dimensional ellipsoid represented by
a Lyapunov function. If the current state is inside the ellipsoid, the system
will stay in it and converge to the set-point. For the inverted pendulum, we
define the set-point to be an upright pendulum at the center of the track.
LMI tools [12] are used to find the largest ellipsoid to give the maximum
freedom to the complex controller being tested. In reality a slightly smaller
ellipsoid is used to guard against errors in the model, actuation and sensing.
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Figure 4.5: Control loop only. (avg: 23.0 µs, stdev: 0.64, max: 26.25 µs)
This check is performed during every sampling period when the complex
controller is submitted and running. When the complex controller fails the
check, eSimplex kills it, and the control command from the simple controller
is used instead, in subsequent periods, until another complex controller is
submitted.
It is important to note that the safety check is for predicting and prevent-
ing unsafe state transitions. Focusing on the symptoms and effects of errors,
rather than errors and faults, has a good reason. Some types of errors are
impossible to catch immediately. For example, suppose that we have a uni-
form random number generator. Given the first three of numbers generated,
say, 0.15, 0.35, and 0.15, there is no way for sure to tell whether it is faulty
or correct. Instead, cumulative effects and symptoms are monitored, and if
any potential to deviate from the specification is found, a flag is raised.
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Figure 4.6: CALC phase execution times, avg: 90.6µs, stdev: 2.24, max:
96.88µs
4.4 Measurements and Evaluation
4.4.1 Timing
For evaluation purposes, various temporal characteristics have been mea-
sured. First the execution of eSimplex is divided into two phases and mea-
sured, respectively. The CALC phase includes sensing, simple and reliable
control, and processing of any subscription request by the complex controller.
After this phase, a complex controller is allowed to run. What follows is the
OUTPUT phase, which includes LMI-based decision logic and actuation.
Figure 4.6 and 4.7 show the execution time distributions.
The total execution time of eSimplex is 176.64 µs on average. The worst
case was 191.51 µs. In order to measure the overhead of eSimplex-based
redundant control and monitoring, we measured the execution time of the
standalone control with the same control code and the physical I/O module.
The standalone version of the controller’s average execution time was
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Figure 4.7: OUTPUT phase execution times, avg: 86.04µs, stdev: 3.58, max:
94.63µs)
40.62 µs, and thus the overhead of eSimplex monitoring is 136.02 µs. Ac-
cording to additional measurements shown in Figure 4.5 and 4.4, the physical
I/O takes about 17 µs. This is mostly from the sensor reading code, which
requires ten port I/O operations, each of which takes about 1 µs. This code
also contains conditional extra processing for negative values when assem-
bling the values read from the register. The effect is shown in Figure 4.6
(a)as two peaks, one for positive and the other for negative angle readings.
Out of 136.02 µs of overhead from eSimplex, the amount incurred by
CALC phase housekeeping operations (approximately 90.6 - 40.62 = 50 µs)
will stay more or less constant, even if a much more time-consuming applica-
tion is used. As a result, when the system is scaled up, the dominant factor
of overhead will be the application-specific algorithm used in the decision
logic.
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Software bugs Type of errors
Infinite loop Timing, omission
Segmentation fault Timing, omission
Divide by zero Timing, omission
Sudden max Content
Gradual push Content
Output 0.0 V Content
Table 4.2: Types of injected faults
4.4.2 Detection and recovery
The tests on how well our experimental application detects and recovers
from errors, we have injected many different faults at random time instances.
Table 4.2 summarizes the injected faults.
After tuning the safety threshold value in the decision module, no content
error could make the pendulum to fall. Dealing with various fail-silent modes
were simpler. Crash failures were safely translated to contained fail-stop
thanks to the process-level protection provided by the operating system. But
if the process-level protection is bypassed using system calls such as kill(
), the whole system can be compromised. Thus this degree of integration
should be allowed only when the criticality of all redundant components are
the same.
4.5 Discussion
In this paper, we described an architecture for dependable on-line testing and
upgrade for real-time embedded systems. We implemented the architecture
with an embedded version of Simplex and used Process Resurrection for mode
switching. Let us reexamine the requirements listed in the introduction to
see how the findings contribute to our overall goals.
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Runtime efficiency. According to the measurements, the fixed part of
dependable testing and upgrade environment only incurs about 50 µs. When
the execution of a simple PID controller takes 40.62 µs, this is not a significant
overhead. The major source of the overhead is in the decision logic, which is
application-specific. The mode switching is also very efficient. When staying
in one mode, there is no computational overhead and only tens of bytes of
storage overhead. Users can choose to remove the monitoring and redundant
execution by mode switching until another testing and upgrade is needed. In
normal operation mode, no computational overhead exists.
Predictability. The variations in all measured execution times are very
small compared to the period of controllers in our experiment. The pre-
dictability can be further improved by using a more predictable operating
system. In our case, Linux met the requirements. For boundary WCET
conditions in control systems, a timing buffer such as the Kalman filter can
be used.
Robustness. In our testing and upgrade mode, the content errors of appli-
cations can be also checked by on-line monitoring, and recovered in real-time
by use of the analytically redundant component in eSimplex.
Applicability. The whole system is implemented in C, and no proprietary
modification is done to the operating system kernel. Any POSIX-compliant
Unix-like operating system can use our framework.
The complete coverage of content errors (i.e. unacceptable output) in
control commands is guaranteed by the safety check inside the decision logic
based on LMI calculations. In addition to the safety check, there are number
of checks including a simple voltage range (-5 to +5V) check and a data
validity check based on finite() in the standard math library. Without the
latter check, some comparisons can return unintended results.
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The safety check is mathematically proven to guarantee the system to
detect the faulty control command that will make the system unrecoverable.
In order to verify that the implementation actually works, we inserted various
value faults in the complex controller. One of the most elaborate was designed
by a control engineer. It swings the pendulum with an extra force at near
the both ends of track. In the normal operation mode without the safety
check, the pendulum would crash. In the testing and upgrade mode, in
which eSimplex is enabled, the complex controller with the artificial faults
were eventually rejected, preventing the pendulum from falling.
One weakness of the tightly coupled eSimplex architecture is that a non-
critical component capable of killing all in the process group can shut down
eSimplex. In VEER, we solve this problem with the partition and protection
provided by RT-VMM
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{static float wdither = 0.0;
static int wratio = 1;
static float wincremental = 0.30;
glob_ctr+=2;
if (( glob_ctr % 2000 ) == 0 )
{
/* wratio = 2; */
wincremental += 0.30;
wdither = wincremental;
}
if (( glob_ctr % 100 ) == 0 )
{
wratio += 10;
}
if ((glob_ctr % wratio) == 0)
{
if ( wdither == wincremental )
wdither = -wincremental;
else if ( wdither == -wincremental )
wdither = wincremental;
}
command += wdither;
}
Table 4.3: Sample faulty control code: “gradual push”, generating content
error
60
5 The real-time virtual machine
monitor
5.1 Background
The concept of virtual machine began to emerge in early to mid-1960s. The
first commercial product that incorporated virtual machine support was IBM
S/360 model 67 and it was announced in 1965. The accompanying virtual
machine control software, CP-67 became available in 1967. It was very suc-
cessful and won over time sharing operating systems such as TSS/360 and
Multics. But perhaps most well-known product is IBM S/370, which included
the popular feature by default [65].
As desktop and workstation computers got powerful, the use of virtual
machine gained its popularity outside the mainframe computing. One of
the first product was VMWare in 1999. Since then, many commercial and
open-source virtualization products have been released. Java’s success also
application-level virtualization popular. But we will focus on hardware-level
virtualization.
Hardware-level virtualization allows multiple operating systems to run at
the same time. In order to efficiently support hardware-level virtualization,
certain conditions must be met. Unfortunately, Intel x86 line of processors
until recently only provided VM86 mode for virtualized 8086. Intel x86 pro-
cessors did not satisfy certain conditions in Popek and Goldberg’s formal
requirement [69, 75]. Because of this deficiency, full native virtualization was
impossible. Some used emulation or binary translation (e.g. qemu, VMWare,
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and VirtualPC), the others used paravirtualization (Xen and Denali). While
emulation and binary translation provides virtual environment that is iden-
tical to the native one, the performance often is an issue due to extra works
needed for the translation. Paravirtualization slightly modifies the machine
architecture to achieve a better performance, but it loses binary compatibil-
ity.
For building RT-VMM on commonly available traditional x86 architec-
ture (pre-VT), we chose paravirtualization for performance and timing rea-
sons. The basis for our implementation is Xen 2.0.7 [9], since the other
mature open-source paravirtualizing VMM, Denali [87] required recompi-
lation of applications due to its ABI modifications. Many of the new Intel
x86 processors as of 2006 are equipped with Intel Virtualization Technology
(VT), promising the full native virtualization without any need for emula-
tion. However, as of writing, there is no product, open source or commercial,
that is stably supporting VT [43]. In fact, the hardware specification is still
evolving; Intel has revised the specification and also added VT-d for I/O
virtualization in mid-2006.
Real-time virtual machine (RTVM) [81] concept has been suggested for
migrating and consolidating real-time embedded systems. In avionics ap-
plications, subsystem consolidation has been popular with the development
of the integrated modular avionics or IMA [3, 76]. FAA has embraced the
concept and also approved the use of RTVM that enables multiple cyclic
executives or rate monotonically scheduled legacy subsystems to be run on
a single hardware without going through costly recertification processes.
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5.2 Desired Properties of RTVM
5.2.1 Protection and isolation
No protection
A single address space operating systems have been widely used for simple
and low-power applications on equally less capable processors. For most em-
bedded systems, cost has been the main reason why commercial manufactur-
ers choose such a platform. But safety-critical real-time embedded systems
developers have favored it because its simplicity yields better predictability.
For these types of systems, comprehensive code analysis is required to be cer-
tified by the standards such as FAA’s DO-178B level A. Since the high cost
oﬄine verification and testing is performed for certification, protection is also
often provided in the form of a logical protection, such as the one described
in ARINC 651-1, “Design Guidance for Integrated Modular Avionics” [28].
For general purpose real-time embedded systems, such an expensive ver-
ification process cannot be justified and it will be prohibitively costly to
perform a comparable degree of checks on much more complex software sys-
tems. Moreover, statically designed, analyzed, composed systems are not
suitable for runtime system configuration changes.
Process-level protection
The most modern general purpose operating systems offer process-level pro-
tection utilizing the memory management unit, context switching support,
and different privilege levels. As part of an operating system, system calls
are provided to user mode processes. System calls are executed in the kernel
mode (i.e. privileged mode) and some of them can affect other processes in
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Figure 5.1: Different protection levels
adverse and unexpected ways [48].
The focus of spacial protection is on main memory, and other accessi-
ble spaces are not well protected or partitionable. For example, the Linux
protection mechanism on the x86 I/O port address space is not as comprehen-
sive or sophisticated as its virtual memory implementation. This is because
hardware access is supposed to be done through the device driver interfaces
exported in file systems. The standard user-level access control mechanism
of Unix operating system is also applied to device driver interfaces.
In addition to the limitations in spacial protection and partitioning, process-
level protection traditionally involves relatively large operating system kernel.
It is almost impossible for large kernel to get high level safety certification.
The complex structure and features have more potential to have residual bugs
than small and simple kernels. The complex kernel and task management
also implies longer context switching times.
VM-based protection
Virtual machines provide the strongest protection and partitioning of time
and space. The relationship between a virtual machine architecture and the
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actual hardware architecture it is running on determines many properties of
the virtual machine. Here, by virtual machine we mean the systems in which
virtual machine monitors communicate with hardware directly and manage
guest operating systems in each virtual machine.
Real-time embedded systems can also benefit from VM environment. For
distributed systems with slow processors, a powerful modern processor with a
proper VM environment can reduce the hardware and maintenance cost. The
isolation provided by a VM architecture can be designed to match the exist-
ing hardware partitioning while providing better collaborative environment
between VMs. This, however, cannot be achieved by existing non-real-time
VM architectures.
When multiple software components are placed in different virtual ma-
chines according to their criticality levels, an ideal real-time virtual machine
manager will assign predefined time slots to each virtual machines in pre-
dictable manner. Since the virtual machine monitor maintains very little
state, switching between virtual machines can be simpler and quicker. Pre-
dictable resource allocation also enables us to assign extra resources to a
specific virtual machine while not affecting other critical virtual machines. It
is only possible by marriage of strongly partitioned and virtualized runtime
environment and the characteristics of real-time computing. This issue will
be further discussed along with the description of recovery mechanisms.
5.2.2 Resource virtualization
Resource in a computer system is defined as anything that software can use
or occupy to accomplish its desired tasks. The most important resource is,
of course, the CPU. A pure virtualization will expose the same CPU archi-
tecture including the instruction set and registers to its guests. In ideal case,
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the only difference seen by guests will be the speed of execution. Similarly,
the virtual machines memory architecture must appear identical to that of
real hardware. I/O space and interrupts also need to be partitioned, masked,
multiplexed or translated in order to create a virtually identical structure and
organization.
Resource virtualization is realized in different ways and at different levels
of completeness due to different goals of each design. On some computer ar-
chitecture, complete virtualization requires a high overhead, therefore forcing
the designers to make a trade-off between efficiency and completeness.
By providing a virtualized hardware architecture that is structurally and
semantically identical to the actual hardware, the existing software including
operating systems and applications can run without any modification. This
property is especially important if the software cannot be modified due to
lack of source code access. Pure virtualization is also required to support
efficient online migrations between physical and virtual environment. This
complete virtualization could be costly on some architectures with incomplete
provisions for virtual machine operation.
Paravirtualization is one way of mitigating the performance overhead.
Instead of performing binary-translation for the unprotected subset of privi-
leged instructions, by providing an optimized interface that is different from
the ISA, the expensive operations can be replaced. The downside is, of course,
the exported virtual machine architecture is not identical to the hardware,
requiring modifications to the existing operating systems.
Intel Pentium processor, the target processor architecture of our project,
has limitation that makes complete virtualization expensive [75]. This is why
we choose paravirtualization.
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5.2.3 Temporal properties
An RTVM architecture, being a real-time system itself, must designed to
exhibit predictable timing behavior. In the heart of the architecture is RT-
VMM , which must be able to switch between RTVMs in bounded time
according to a schedule.
In addition to RTVM switching, executions of the hypercalls implemented
in RTVM monitors should be kept short and predictable. If an RTVM causes
hypercalls to be executed by invoking privileged instructions, the calls must
execute to completion even if the CPU budget for the RTVM is depleted.
This is because the state of RTVM monitors must be kept consistent when
switching to a different RTVM. In this case, we must be able to tell what is
the maximum possible overtime that an RTVM can have due to a hypercall.
Although the ideal RTVM should provide an environment equivalent to
the physical CPU at 1/n speed, it is extremely hard to closely emulate such
an environment. If an RTVM is given 1 second slot every 10 seconds, the
effective processing power will be 1/10 of the physical processor. However,
if the original software written for a processor with 1/10 performance and
was designed to send a message at the end of its period of 10 seconds, the
timing will be off in the RTVM by sending it 9 seconds early. In traditional
cyclical executive systems, such timing is fixed by design and other coop-
erating systems are built on that knowledge. By further dividing the size
of RTVM execution slots or quantum, this effect can be reduced, but this
also increases the VM switching overhead. Thus when mixing legacy cyclical
executive tasks and new priority scheduled tasks, a timing buffer may be
necessary.
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5.2.4 Spacial properties
It is vital to maintain the ability to switch RTVMs instantly whenever neces-
sary. Any work in spacial dimension must be preemptible or have very short
predictable preemption delay. In addition to the preemtibility, VM switching
should not entail too much bookeeping. Since the accurate timing is the most
important property we want to have in real-time systems, the rule of trade-off
in spacial dimension changes from non-real-time systems. For example, Intel
i386 processor does not support virtualization of its port I/O address space
in protected mode. For compatibility reasons, some commercial VMMs vir-
tualize the space in software though binary translation [84], but the overhead
of virtualization may not be acceptable for RTVM monitors.
A more formal description on required properties are given in [69].
5.2.5 Instruction virtualization
At processor instruction level, all privileged instructions are emulated by
RTVM monitor code. When a privileged instruction (e.g. HLT) is executed
from a virtual machine, a CPU trap will let the RTVM monitor to handle
the situation by simulating the effect of the instruction invocation for the
virtual machine in a safe way.
The privileged instructions are as follows:
• HLT, CLTS, LGDT, LIDT, LLDT, LTR, LMSW, and MOV (to/from
control/debug/test registers) for i386
• INVD, WBINVD, and INVLPG for i486
• RDMSR, RDTSC, and WRMSR for Pentium and later.
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The system must enforce the temporal and spacial partitioning, instead
of relying on voluntary conformance.
5.3 Enforcing partitioning and fault
containment
The RTVM architecture [81] for avionics systems imposes a set of rules that
the guest software must follow. Since these systems are tested and verified
throughly for the certification, the conformance to the system rules may
not be strictly enforced by run-time environments. For general real-time
applications with potentially more bugs, the isolation and partitioning of
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resources must be enforced in the system level, like the conventional virtual
machine monitor-based (VMM) execution environments. This is why we
need a real-time VMM as the foundation of VEER.
5.3.1 Why partition
In order for an RTVM system to work properly, component faults must
be isolated with no hidden path of propagation. The partitioning can be
obtained by using special oﬄine analysis and design tools, but the cost of
reaching a high coverage for complex real-time systems can be too high. Also,
it is only suitable for statically scheduled systems, not for dynamic systems.
One could use a conventional operating system as an isolation environ-
ment. It is true that the process-level protection does provide a string pro-
tection in memory space, and also use of real-time scheduler can provide a
temporal partitioning. However, since other operating system features are
shared, one process can affect another in various ways. For example, if mul-
tiple processes belong to one process group, a kill system call by one process
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can terminate all others. Also, since system calls are not guaranteed to be
idempotent, sharing of kernel features can lead to inconsistent and unpre-
dictable states. Commercial safety-critical operating systems are designed
with this issue in mind, and application and OS code is analyzed and veri-
fied so that a preemption always leaves the OS in a consistent state. This kind
of verification is almost impossible for general purpose operating systems.
The strong spatial and temporal partitioning and the ability to dynami-
cally and accurately reconfigure the partitioning are the key enabling factors
of real-time virtual machines.
5.3.2 Timing and spatial partitioning
For real-time systems, temporal partitioning is the most unique and impor-
tant among many others. In order to have a strict control over timings from
the RT-VMM to applications in VMs, the RT-VMM’s periodic timer event
must be consistently propagated down to guest kernels. The semantics of
timer events must be also consistent across the system.
In addition to temporal partitioning, spacial partitioning also plays an
important role in real-time systems. If a failure occurs in a component, it is
desirable to prevent it from propagate to other components. Since the RT-
VMM provides hardware-level virtualization, careful organization of com-
ponents will enable the fault containment down to the lowest level. For
example, a mismanagement of video card by a UI component may make the
console unusable and require system reset to recover. With RT-VMM, the UI
handling subsystem with hardware access can be isolated in a separate VM,
so that the recovery of UI can independently performed without disturbing
other components. Containing faults also helps reducing the recovery time.
In normal operation mode, the RT-VMM schedules VMs in a predeter-
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mined fixed time slot according to the scheduling method illustrated in [81],
which is used in some of the DO 178B level A certified systems (Figure 5.3).
The major cycle time must be no longer than the minimum of all task peri-
ods in the system. In theory, the size of the time slot should ideally be the
greatest common divisor of the WCETs. But in reality smaller time slots
will incur more scheduling overhead. The experimental result section shows
the amount of overhead we can expect.
5.4 The RT-VMM architecture
5.4.1 Task scheduler
The task scheduler is responsible for scheduling both normal case executions
and recovery actions of tasks.
If we are to use conventional schedulability analysis based on the worst
case recovery times of all tasks, its normal case CPU utilization will be very
low. For a reasonably reliable system, it is a waste of CPU times. It also
cannot distinguish between critical and non-critical recovery. If the scheduler
is modified to deal with all cases, it will be a very complex core component
with a more probability of having bugs.
To make scheduling simpler and controllable, we utilize a virtual machine
architecture to divide scheduler into two levels. The top-level scheduler in
the virtual machine monitor is based on a simple TDM-like scheduler, which
assigns one or more slots to each real-time virtual machine. It has been
shown that the combination of this high-level TDM-like scheduler and intra-
VM real-time priority scheduler can work in predictable way with computable
schedulability bounds [81].
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5.4.2 Event handler/schedulers
Interrupts are asynchronous events. When an interrupt is raised, an interrupt
service routine is executed to process the event. Unless it is disabled in
the hardware (i.e. programmable interrupt controller), the software has no
control over how often interrupts can occur. If an interrupt line is disabled
arbitrarily, the system may miss an important event and loose data. If we
allow free interruption of real-time tasks, the blocking times will be too long.
In a virtual machine environment, it can be worse. Suppose a virtual
machine is getting time slots worth of 10 % of total CPU time. The ideal
virtual machine would simulate a slow machine (1/10 speed). However, if
interrupt is generated too frequently, it can exceed the maximum rate that
can be generated on the simulated slow machine, and introduce much more
frequent blocking to the software running on the virtual machine.
For this reason, asynchronous events must be regulated in a special way
so that the blocking times are reasonably short and bounded, and the prob-
ability of missing an event is low.
5.4.3 Control VM
After the system is booted with the RT-VMM, virtual machines need to be
started. In a static system, since the organization and configuration virtual
machines do not change, a static boot-time start-up scenario works well. But
for the RT-VMM to work, we need a capability to start, stop, and change
configuration of virtual machines. This, obviously cannot be done with a
fixed start-up script.
One of simple approaches is building all VM management functions in
the RT-VMM. This would work only if the RT-VMM has all of high-level
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features implemented internally. For example, if saving configuration data
to a disk is needed, the RTVM monitor needs a device driver for the disk
and a file system driver. Also, if disk write is issued by the most privileged
RT-VMM, all virtual machines running on top of it will see the I/O time as
a blocking time. If it is done by a virtual machine, it will be a part of its
execution time or a local blocking time.
For this reason, a user level proxy is used. The proxy runs inside the con-
trol VM, a privileged to have access to hypercalls in the RT-VMM. The proxy
can start, stop, and submit a new configuration. Whether to honor it or not
is entirely upto the RT-VMM. If the monitor finds submitted configuration
is not appropriate, it may reject it.
5.4.4 Summary
We have discussed how the RT-VMM architecture is organized and how each
element must function. The major challenges are summarized as follows:
• Enforcing a safety in critical ordering with traditional dependency
management techniques can be too restrictive. We need to utilize
application-specific data usage semantics and enforce Use relations.
• Partitioning based on static analysis/verification or even process-level
protection is not adequate. Static methods have limitations in checking
certain dynamic properties, and with process-level protections, it is
still possible to affect other processes with system calls and by making
the OS state inconsistent. Thus we need a stronger partitioning and
protection, such as the one provided by a virtual machine architecture
• For the task and recovery scheduler to work properly, modification of
existing priority scheduler has limitations. If a simple analysis is done
74
PIT
ISRs_time
Guest OS
ac_timer
scheduler
timer
int Softirq vectors_time += 1 ms;
RDTSC
PIT
Timing inconsistencies
Delayed invocation of scheduler
Figure 5.4: Non-real-time nature of the original Xen
without any modification, the outcome will be too pessimistic, making
the CPU utilization too low. If the full modification will result in a very
complex scheduler which may contain a new bug. We approach this
with two-level scheduler with each level implements relatively simple
and straight forward scheduling, but becomes powerful when combined.
• Asynchronous events can disturb a virtual machine by generating a
burst of interrupts in a short period time. If we allow this, the maxi-
mum blocking time for each virtual machine will be too long. We also
cannot simply disable interrupts and miss events. We will transform
asynchronous events into pseudo-synchronous events with low proba-
bility of losing events and a better schedulability bounds for each VM.
5.5 RT-VMM implementation
We implemented the RT-VMM on the Intel x86 architecture. We modified
and extended Xen, an open source VMM. Xen 2.0.7 on Intel x86 provides
a form paravirtualization that requires the guest operating systems to be
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slightly modified. At the cost of slight incompatibility at the low-level, Xen
performs very well compared to binary translation-based approaches. Since
our system would benefit more from the performance than the backward
compatibility, we chose Xen 2.0.7 over other candidates.
5.5.1 Timing
Since Xen is designed for non-real-time systems, we first had to modify the
way it keeps track of time and delivers “ticks” to guest operating systems. In
non-real-time systems, a delay or loss of a timer tick may not matter much,
but it will most certainly affect the correctness of real-time systems.
The source of problem is two fold. (See Figure 5.4 and 5.5) First, the
delivery of the virtual timer interrupt could be delayed. For real-time sys-
tems, timer interrupts must be delivered in timely manner with a small jit-
ter. When a VM scheduling event and a delivery of virtual interrupt are not
synchronized, a guest operating system may not be able to correctly per-
form certain time-bound tasks such application scheduling. We modified the
softirq for the scheduler to be raised every time a timer interrupt occurs so
that the scheduler can run at every hardware timer interrupt whose period
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is configured to be the minimum VM schedule quantum. Since the periodic
timer interrupt handler does not trail time-consuming tasks when config-
ured appropriately, virtual timer interrupts are delivered with an acceptable
amount of delay.
Second, a guest operating system in a VM could use inconsistent means of
interpreting the time. For example, Xen’s system time is simply incremented
by a preset constant approximation (1000/HZ) of the timer interval, while
applications and guest operating systems are capable of referring to more
accurate time reference such as IA-32 time stamp counter. Since XenLinux
uses Xen’s system time as its time reference and the time progression is
internally determined (e.g. incrementing jiffies), some of the time-bound
events (e.g. POSIX interval timer) may not work as expected. For real-time
systems, accurate time reference and a consistent method of interpreting time
progression are required. We unify the time reference to the TSC. Since the
semantics of the timer interrupt is very clear and deterministic in RT-VMM,
we propagate VMM’s jiffies value to make the time progression uniform across
the system.
XenLinux, the guest operating system, needs changes in addition to the
ones mentioned above. Most notably, the way timed events are fired needed a
modification. Although the stock Linux having “at-least” semantics for timed
events may be appropriate for non-real-time applications, it is problematic
for real-time applications as the semantics allows deadline misses. Since
we have made the “time progression” deterministic across the system, the
semantics was changed to “exactly”. If the system is designed to keep the
non-preemptible kernel section short (e.g. no lengthy serial communication),
this semantics can always be honored.
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5.5.2 Scheduling and Recovery
The VM scheduling is carried out by a time division multiplexing-like (TDM)
scheduler that supports the scheduling paradigm described in [81]. It is a
static scheduler that needs oﬄine schedulability tests. After the slot assign-
ment is done, the schedule and other parameters such as scheduling quantum
or slot size and the size of a cycle are supplied to the RT-VMM at its build
time. The scheduler assigns slots to launched VMs and schedule them ac-
cording to the plan.
The RT-VMM does not reschedule even if the current VM is idle, nor
does the idle handler of our guest Linux invoke the hypercall for reschedul-
ing. This simplifies the scheduler, since the reschedule is only done at the
slot boundaries. There is no need to keep track of individual VM’s time
consumption.
The scheduler must keep track of how the slots are used when increasing
the number of allocated slots to a recovering VM. This is called boosting.
If a boosting occurs, any free slots are first used. If no free slot is available
or more slots are needed, the scheduler selects victims based on the oﬄine
recovery plan. The scheduler enters the boost mode if a specific hypercall
is made by the control VM, a special VM that monitors the health of other
VMs. This hypercall can also be invoked by the VM with failed components.
The scheduler exits the boost mode either when an explicit hypercall is made
to notify the end of recovery or when the maximum number of extra time
slot assignment has reached.
Faults occurs at different layers of abstractions, RTVM only defects faults
violating the VM partition rules and VM API usage rules. For this reason,
we do not offer a generalized detection mechanism. We provide primitives
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and usage guidelines for designing application-specific methods.
5.5.3 Interrupts and Hypercalls
Even though some hypercall interfaces were modified, the original Xen’s de-
sign is mostly used as is. This is also true for the way RT-VMM handles
interrupts. Privileged virtual machines run privileged kernel and provide
device drivers and ISR.
The RT-VMM execution modes can be divided into two: the internal and
the external mode. In the internal mode, the RT-VMM runs several short
bookkeeping and clean-up operations, and most importantly the scheduler.
Since these are ran periodically in RT-VMM, they can be viewed by a VM
as a very short high priority task. In the external mode, hardware interrupts
cause ISRs to run and software service requests are carried out as hypercalls.
As hypercalls run on behalf of the guest software, they can be counted as
a part of the local VM execution time. Periodic interrupts can be regarded
as synchronous events, so that real-time can easily take them into account
when performing timing analysis.
Purely asynchronous interrupts require a more careful look. Open net-
work interface is an example. While maximizing the throughput is the goal
of the most non-real-time systems, real-time systems prefer limiting the per-
formance if the blocking times are reduced and the system becomes more
predictable. We offer users two options: 1) enable the invocation of the ISR
in the privileged guest whenever the corresponding interrupt comes in. If the
length of the ISR is long or the interrupt rate is very high, the effect on the
unrelated VMs may be significant. 2) The RT-VMM can be optionally con-
figured to disable the handling of the interrupt when the corresponding driver
VM is not currently running. This option effectively limits the interrupt rate
79
and minimizes the interrupts’ effect on other VMs.
5.5.4 Partitioning and Virtualization
Enforced partitioning provides isolation. Virtualization provides a uniform
interface to the underlying resources so that migration or reuse of software
is simplified. Since the paravirtualized architecture by Xen is also used in
the RT-VMM, the guest operating systems must be modified. For the sake
of simplicity we adopted XenLinux, which is based on Linux kernel 2.6.11.
Since we are using Xen 2.0.7’s method of partitioning and virtualization,
the I/O space is not ideally partitioned or virtualized. For PCI devices, the
RT-VMM inherits Xen’s capability of partitioning the devices by making only
selected devices visible to a specific VM. This, however, does not control the
I/O privilege of a privileged VM in detail, so any privileged VM can freely
perform any port I/O operations. A very coerce guest kernel-based control
over I/O privilege level is provided by not allowing unprivileged VMs to do
any port I/O operations. Since direct hardware access is often required by
real-time embedded system software, use of binary translation or emulation
as in VMware [84] and QEMU [10] is not suitable. It is ideal to have some-
thing equivalent to IOMMU for virtualization and access control, but until
it is widespread, we resort to limited solutions.
5.6 Experiments and Evaluation
The experimental system is based on an MMC-2 Mobile Pentium III 750 MHz
processor with 288MB of SD-RAM at 100MHz and Intel 440BX chipset. The
installed peripherals include two video cards (1 built-in), one network, one
BT878-based frame grabber and one D/A - A/D card for controlling the
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Figure 5.6: Periodic timer accuracy: single 1ms slot (avg:9.999 ms,
stdev:0.035, max:10.385 ms, min: 9.614 ms)
inverted pendulum.
5.6.1 Overhead of RT-VMM
Periodic timer
On our experimental system, the major cycle time is 10 ms and the slot size
is 1 ms. We first measured the accuracy of the interval timer in the guest
Linux operating system. Figure 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 show the result. When all
ten slots were allocated to a single VM, the average interval of 10 ms interval
timer was 9.999 ms with 771 µs of variation range. The standard deviation
was 0.035. When only one slot is assigned out of ten, the result shows no
significant changes. The average was 9.999 ms, and the variation range was
625 µs. The quality of the interval timer depends on both the RT-VMM
latency and the guest operating system’s maximum blocking time.
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Hypercall blocking times
We reused the Xen’s hypercall interface with a small change in time-related
calls. In this hypercall architecture, multicall() combines series of hyper-
calls. Individual hypercalls made during the steady state after start-up are
mmu update(), update va mapping(), update descriptor(), stack switch(),
and fpu taskswitch(). These are often bundled into a list of calls and
passed as an argument to a single hypercall, multicall() for the perfor-
mance optimization. Thus, measuring the duration of multicall() captures
the longest hypercall execution time. The result of measurement is shown
in Figure 5.9. There were six VMs with one 1ms slot assigned for each.
VMs were launched and performed multiple intensive tasks to incur many
context switches inside each VM. The average duration was 2.38 µs and the
maximum was 34.62 µs. During the non-steady state phase (OS loading &
initialization), the maximum duration of a hypercall was 104.1 µs.
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Other RT-VMM blocking times
Next, we measured the overhead of the periodic tasks of the RT-VMM. The
major contributers to this number are the timer interrupt handler and the
scheduler which run every 1 ms in our configuration. We scheduled all ten
slots to a single VM. In this case, a run of scheduler does not entail VM
context switching, so we can measure only the overhead incurred by the
scheduler. We measured the performance of integer operations using a bench-
mark suit, nbench 2.2.2. The result was almost identical when we used the
Linux’s bogomips values. The result shows the average of 0.33 % perfor-
mance loss over the native Linux environment. It translates to 3.33 µs of
blocking time per 1 ms slot.
Another type of overhead of RT-VMM is VM context switching. We ran
ten VMs with 1 ms slot assigned for each VM, and measured the aggre-
gated performance by running nbench inside each and every VM for multiple
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Figure 5.9: Hypercall execution times - multicall() (avg:2.38 µs, stdev 2.73,
max 34.62 µs, min 0.28 µs)
times back-to-back in parallel. Since each VM runs only one user process,
guest-level context switching was minimal. However, the measured overhead
includes guest kernel’s execution times, mainly the timer interrupt handling
(10 ms period), and the scheduler, and a little bit of console I/O. The ag-
gregated performance was 1.7 % slower than the native Linux environment,
which translates to 16.93 µs of blocking time per 1 ms slot. This duration
includes 3.33 µs of VMM’s internal periodic executions described in the pre-
vious paragraph. The results are summarized in Table 5.1.
Network interrupts
Finally, we introduced the network interrupt. While the general server ap-
plications of VMM are mainly concerned with the throughput, we are more
interested in how much overhead or blocking time a network interrupt gen-
erates. With our experimental setup of file transfer in an isolated switched
network, the privileged VM with all-slot (10 out of 10) scheduled gets 1168 in-
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nbench
int score
Overhead Blocking
times
(µs/slot)
Native Linux 3.306 n/a n/a
RT-VMM periodics 3.295 0.33 % 3.33
+ VM switchings 3.250 1.7 % 16.93
+ Net interrupts 3.150 4.7 % 47.19
Table 5.1: Blocking times. The rate of net interrupt is 1.13 ints/ms. i.e.
(47.19-16.93)/1.13 = 26.78 µs/int
terrupts per seconds. (Between 3c905C-txm and eepro100, 1500 bytes MTU)
When the performance of the single-slot (1 ms) scheduled VM is measured
while the same transfer is on going, the privileged VM with nine-slot (9 ms)
scheduled receives 1103 interrupts per second. The interrupt count is aver-
aged over a 5 minute period. The performance of the single-slot scheduled
VM is measured using nbench, which runs for a little over 10 minutes. The
result shows that 30.26 µs is used for the interrupt processing out of its 1 ms
slot time. Since there are 1.103 interrupts per 1 ms, the overhead is 26.78 µs
per interrupt. The file transfer test would also incur disk controller interrupt,
but we eliminated this by using a ram disk based file system. The OS-level
ISR is run only when the privileged VM is scheduled. At a higher transfer
rate, this can become a significant overhead. In order to keep the blocking
time under a certain level, the rate has to be limited.
In summary, the typical blocking time experienced by the application
process is 16.93 µs per 1 ms slot in our experiment. If network traffic is
present, one interrupt causes additional 26.78 µs of blocking time. If the rate
of network is limited, the total blocking times can be kept reasonably small.
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6 VEER: Recovery using
RT-VMM
VEER (Virtual Execution Environment for Robust Real-Time Systems) is a
software architecture that utilizes RT-VMM for designing efficient recovery-
enabled real-time embedded systems. The hardware-level virtualization al-
lows execution of multiple operating system instances and guarantees each
OS/VM meets all timing requirements. The RT-VMM prevents any resource
contamination from one OS failure (i.e. crash or hang). Since embedded soft-
ware often access special hardware, the potential failure can easily take the
entire system down. With RT-VMM, such an incident can be isolated. In
addition to the RT-VMM’s protection, VEER provides a set of design guide-
line for organizing components and subsystems according to their criticality
and dependency for better fault isolation and dependency management.
VEER is not for safety critical systems. Rather, it is more targeted to
general real-time applications where use of COTS or open-source components
without any quality guarantee is common. VEER’s RT-VMM can host mul-
tiple instances of different operating systems, whereas RTVM architecture
[81] is closer to the OS-level virtualization technologies such as OpenVZ [66]
and Solaris 10 containers [33].
6.1 Differentiated recovery
The use of RT-VMM changes the traditional assumptions on the recovery.
For normal systems, for instance, if the processing speed of a processor is 100
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MIPS, the aggregated speed experienced by all the applications on the system
cannot exceed 100 MIPS. Under a real-time virtual machine architecture,
the top-level scheduler may allocate a “contingency slot” to prevent rare
exceptions from causing deadline misses. This allows a virtual machine to
run ”faster” than the virtual speed limit to recover in time.
As illustrated in Chapter 2, the existence of explicit timing requirements
on fault detection and recovery will certainly help improving the availability
of real-time systems. However, setting aside a significant portion of CPU
time for rare failure occasion is costly.
The use of RT-VMM allows to maintain a pool of slots for recovery that
are shared among VMs. If no free slot is available, RT-VMM can suspend
non-critical or non-real-time tasks to recover more critical real-time tasks.
Who gets what depends on the system design and organization.
In the actual implementation, an additional hypercall is added to the ex-
isting RT-VMM in order to switch between normal mode and recovery mode.
Two sets of schedule must be supplied to the scheduler by the designer for
the two modes to work. An example is shown in Table 6.3. When the control
VM detects or is notified of a failure-recovery (e.g. process resurrection of
the inverted pendulum controller), it invokes rtvm sched boost( ) hyper-
call to boost the corresponding VM according to the predefined schedule.
The request for transitions from normal to recovery mode (i.e. boosting) can
only be made in the control VM (i.e. VM0). Other VMs can make requests
to end the local recovery mode. The control VM can end any VM’s recovery
mode. For Linux guests, the hypercall can be invoked via the proc file system
interface, which is created by the driver, rtvm sched boost. This simplifies the
interfacing user-mode monitoring daemons to VEER.
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6.1.1 Failure detection
For a recovery to work, we must be able to detect failures as early as possible.
There are different types of failures and each of them can be detected different
ways.
When a generic central monitoring method is used, it may not be a best
way to react to certain failure events. For example, if a periodic monitoring is
used, the failure-detection latency can be as long as the period of the monitor.
While periodic polling of system status works best for certain type of failures,
this is not the case for failure modes such as crash. For crash failures detection
and recovery, we use Process Resurrection, which is described in Chapter 3.
Process Resurrection can be used for recovery only, if a predefined user signal
is used as a custom trigger. Any other detection mechanism can trigger the
fast recovery in this way. Also for real-time systems, non-crash failures are
highly application specific and timing errors are often associated with the
symptoms. We use eSimplex to mask the content (e.g. unacceptable results)
and timing errors (e.g. deadline miss). If the overhead of running redundant
controller is too high, an ORTGA-based [61] analytic redundancy may be
possible for the application.
6.1.2 Criticality ordering
As described in Chapter 1, components must be partitioned according to
their criticality levels so that non-critical components cannot make critical
components fail. But if two components with different criticality levels com-
munication with each other, how can we guarantee that the non-critical one
is not going to adversely affect the critical one when a fault occurs?
The traditional dependency analysis can be used, but to guarantee a
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Figure 6.1: Traditional view of dependency Vs. Use/Depend concept
safety, it will impose too much restrictions on the system. For example, if
component A is a critical component and component B is a non-critical one,
the only way to ensure the safety is by showing A does not depend on B.
In other words, there should be no connection from A’s input ports to B’s
output ports, only allowing data flow from A to B and preventing ones from
B to A. (See Figure 6.1)
This is a correct and sufficient condition that make sure our criticality or-
dering works, but can be too restrictive in some cases. For example, suppose
that there is a critical component that checks outputs from one non-critical
component against the one from a critical component, and chooses the out-
put from non-critical components, only if the data is available and it passes
the check, otherwise it chooses the one from the critical-component. In this
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case, an incorrect or absent output from the non-critical component cannot
adversely affect the critical monitoring component. But according to the
traditional dependency graph, we are not allowed to design the system this
way.
This restriction can be removed by looking at the semantic level depen-
dencies as well as syntactic level dependencies. In above case, there is a
syntactic level dependency, but no semantic level dependency. When a fail-
ure of a component has no effect on syntactically dependent components, we
call it a Use relation. Thus if we can enforce a Use relation to non-critical
to critical data flow, we know our criticality ordering rule is not violated
and faults are isolated at lower criticality levels. A formal description of Use
relation is available in [30].
In order to enforce a Use relation, application semantics must be taken
into account. This is because a Use relation is determined by how an ap-
plication is processing the incoming data. Thus it is impossible to have a
generic Use enforcer that works for any application. We can, however, pro-
vide the hooks to static analysis tools such as [50] that perform architecture-
implementation conformance tests. Such tests can also generate runtime
checks for checking dynamic properties. Certain checks can be placed ouside
the virtual machine to reduce the execution time variations cased by the
checks.
It is also important to note that enforcing Use relations to data flows from
non-critical to critical components is essential, having Use relations between
components regardless of criticality levels also helps reducing recovery time or
performance degradation by isolating faults and limiting the affected region
in the system.
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6.2 VEER Design Guidelines
Even though we can prioritize urgent recoveries over non-critical tasks or use
free slots, it will take a much longer time to recover if faults have been prop-
agated to other VMs and have corrupted them. In fact, many faults are not
immediately detectable, so they might propagate widely until they are finally
detected. Moreover, since faults can propagate through legitimate channels,
architecture-level isolation alone cannot prevent the propagation. Fault oc-
curs at different layers of abstraction. A comprehensive fault containment
management requires the use of both VM level and application level fault
containment measures. In VEER, we provide a set of guidelines to follow in
order to better utilize the features of the RT-VMM architecture. An example
will be provided in the experiment and evaluation section.
The key to contain a fault is the proper management of dependency [30].
Among many factors, we consider the following two: criticality and capability.
(i) Criticality: It is important to make sure the critical components are
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not depending on non-critical components. The first step is to categorize the
system components into at least two criticality levels, critical and non-critical.
For example, the computerized brake system in a vehicle can be regarded as
a critical component, whereas the air conditioning system is important but
non-critical. The next step is to make sure that the components with different
criticality are not placed in the same container. (e.g. process, process group,
or VM, depending on how the system is organized) For example, if a non-
critical thread and critical thread belong to the same process, a segmentation
fault by the non-critical component will also bring down the critical one. The
final step is to follow the Use-Depend concept [80] to make sure the critical
components do not depend on non-critical component. Oﬄine analysis tools
such as [50] can be used to enforce this in design time.
(ii) Capability: In normal operation modes, components with different capa-
bilities can coexist without any problem. But when a failure occurs, more
potent component can do much more damage. For example, X servers often
access hardware and kernel memory directly for the improved performance
and control. When it crashes and compromises the hardware or the kernel,
other unrelated processes can also be affected. If we have the perfect failure
models for every component in the system to predict their failure modes,
we can use this information to separate the components. However, if such
information is not available, we should consider the worst case by examining
the capability of each component. The simplest separation will be between
computation-only components and the ones with low-level hardware access.
The actual recovery method varies depending on the failure model of the
components in a partition. For example, if operating system failures are
taken into account, the recovery methods such as VM-restart and VM-hot-
swap can be implemented using existing techniques. It is also important
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Components Criticality Low-level Real-time Grouping
sensing
actuation high yes yes (10 ms) VM1
HAC,
Simplex high no yes (20 ms) VM2
HPC low no yes (20ms) VM3
UI low yes no VM4
video server low yes soft VM5
remote
access low no no VM3
Table 6.1: The components in the system
note that not all components or VM require real-time recovery. The system
requirement may allow delay of recovering certain real-time tasks, especially
non-critical ones.
6.3 Experimental application
6.3.1 Organization
Our experimental system is composed of six subsystems or components as
listed in Table 6.1. The first three are migrated from an existing system, and
the others are either new or reimplementation of old components. We have
classified each component according to its criticality and capability. First,
the critical components are separated and placed in a separate VM. The first
three components were originally running in the same process group on a
single machine. In the old configuration, if the user-submitted HPC (high
performance controller) embeds an assembly code that kills every process in
the process group, the HAC (high assurance controller) and all others get
killed. For this reason, we have enhanced the security with a compiler-based
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technique. In the new configuration, a malicious HPC can only damage itself
and the remote control server, which can be restarted in the background. In
this way, fault containment has been improved.
Second, the ones with low-level hardware access capabilities are separated.
If the UI component malfunctions, it can render the console unusable. For
many systems, rebooting is the only solution. We are also rebooting the OS,
but only for the specific VM. Although a reboot of the VM takes more than
10 seconds on our platform, other components are not at all affected by it.
Non-critical real-time and non-real-time components can coexist as long
as the operating system can meet the timing requirement of the real-time
component. In VM3, we have such a mixture. They are hard to separate
because the remote access server launches user supplied HPCs.
The RT-VMM is depending on VM0 to carry out certain tasks. If VM0
crashes, the default behavior of RT-VMM is to reboot. However, this can
be optionally disabled. In addition, it is recommended that the number
of drivers in VM0 be minimized. If it can be avoided, no direct hardware
driver should be there except perhaps the disk back-end drivers for launching
other VMs. This is also unnecessary if RAM disk is used for the root file
system. We use RAM disk-based root file systems for most critical VMs in
the experiment.
A schedule is determined and built into the RT-VMM in build time. The
schedule also includes the prioritized restart order and other details. The RT-
VMM first uses empty slots for recovery, then non-real-time components’
slots, and finally non-critical real-time components’ slots. Every VEER-
based system has VM0, a control VM, for bootstrapping and monitoring. It
can be used for monitoring the health of other VMs. We have total of six of
VMs in the system. The schedule and recovery plan are shown in Table 6.2
94
VM Name Normal Boost Critical Real-time
0 super 3,7 1-10 Yes No
1 phys-io 1 1 Yes Yes
2 simplex 2 2,6,7 Yes Yes
3 hpc 4 4,5,7 No Yes
4 ui 5,6 5,6,7 No No
5 vid 8,9,10 6-10 No Yes
Table 6.2: The schedule and properties of each VM
and the actual configuration is shown in Table 6.3. VM0’s recovery mode is
enabled when the system first boots in order to get the system ready as soon
as possible. Once VM0 is ready, it must be transition to normal mode and
launch other VMs.
6.3.2 Recovery
Although we do not guarantee the recovery of critical components, the RT-
VMM can try to recover them in time by suspending all others. In this
example, however, a failure of VM1 will likely affect the hardware and the
external physical device (inverted pendulum), and any attempt to recover
only the software will be futile. The sensing and actuation component in VM1
can recover from a simple process crash using PR (Process Resurrection) [52].
However, if the hardware state is compromised by the failure, the only cure
may be a reboot. Since a reboot of VM1 takes 10.17 seconds on average at
the full CPU speed and the deadline is 10 ms, this cannot be a viable recovery
method. VM-hot-swap may be possible, but software-only swap may not be
able to recover the hardware, if the hardware cannot be safely and completely
reset by software. In this case, software-originated critical hardware-related
failures, which may require hardware redundancy for masking contaminated
hardware.
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#define SLOTS_PER_CYCLE 10
#define NUM_VM 6
short int sched_norm[SLOTS_PER_CYCLE] =
{1, 2, 0, 3, 4, 4, 0, 5, 5, 5};
short int sched_recovery[NUM_VM][SLOTS_PER_CYCLE] =
{ {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, /* VM0 */
{1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1}, /* VM1 */
{1, 2, 0, 3, 4, 2, 2, 5, 5, 5}, /* VM2 */
{1, 2, 0, 3, 3, 4, 6, 5, 5, 5}, /* VM3 */
{1, 2, 0, 3, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5}, /* VM4 */
{1, 2, 0, 3, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5} }; /* VM5 */
short int criticality_level[NUM_VM] =
{1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2};
/* 0: can boost any. can unboost any
* 1: can boost self. can unboost self
* 2: can boost non. can unboost self
*/
short int boost_priv[NUM_VM] =
{0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2};
Table 6.3: The actual schedule configuration of the experiment
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The simplex/HAC module in VM2 is auto-restart enabled using PR. The
average restart time is 614.1 µs and the worst case is 729.1 µs (Figure 6.3).
It includes clean-up operations before restart and the initialization activities
such as communication channel creation, setting up scheduler and signal han-
dlers, and creating and programming an interval timer. If PR is not used, the
fresh start-up takes 2.25 ms on average (Figure 6.4). The measured WCET of
simplex/HAC in its steady sate is 63.38 µs (Figure 6.5). Even if we overesti-
mate the WCET as 80 µs, the execution-recovery-re-execution cycle will take
889.1 µs, which is smaller than the usable slot size of 952.81 µs (1 ms - 47.19
µs blocking time per slot). In this case, we do not need to assign additional
slots for recovery. Since the coverage of PR is limited to crash failures, the
types of faults that do not cause crash are translated to “deadline misses”
and detected externally by the helper VM. If the monitoring daemon does
not hear from the VM2 components, it initiates a restart of the processes. In
this case, we need to launch the processes from scratch and two more slots
are needed before the end of the major cycle. This is the only VM where
real-time recovery is needed.
The video encoding and streaming server is composed of two software
components from an open source media processing software, FFmpeg: ffm-
peg and ffserver. They are soft-real-time processes meaning that their dead-
lines are not strict, but if the deadlines are constantly missed, the latency
of the streaming video will increase and eventually lose its usefulness. Its
availability is not strictly required, but improves user experience. From the
recovery point of view, there are two kinds of failure modes in this subsystem,
the failure modes that require a process restart and the ones require a VM
restart. Since the frame grabber hardware is being accessed by the software
components in this VM, a software failure may corrupt the hardware state.
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Figure 6.3: Restart times of the decision module using process resurrection
Some hardware problems can be solved by driver reloading, but not all OS-
hardware combination support it. To simplify the recovery, we always reset
the VM. It is also monitored by the helper VM and if VM5 crashes, two more
slots are allocated to speed up the recovery. The reboot recovery with five
slots takes about 18 seconds, and 30 seconds without the extra slots. The
boot process is faster than the others because VM5 uses a root file system
on a physical partition, not a compressed ram disk image.
The UI in VM4 is used by the local user for editing and submitting a
custom HPC and viewing the video stream. The main component in this
VM is the X server. The X server bypasses the video BIOS and directly
manipulates the video card. It also accesses the kernel memory space. In
most cases, a crash only needs restart of the X server, but there are cases that
need restart of OS. The OS restart takes a little more than 10 seconds and
launching X server/twm takes about 4 seconds at the full CPU speed. When
rebooting, one more slot is assigned. The recovery time in this configuration
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Figure 6.4: Fresh start times of the decision module
is 46 seconds. The user can also trigger a restart.
The components in VM3 are treated differently in recovery. Since the
HPC component is submitted by an external user, it may contain malicious
code. The examples of malicious controller code are taken from [59]. When
the system is compromised and the service is not available (periodic polling
of the service is performed by VM0), VM3 is rebooted. If the remote control
server is killed, it tries to restart by itself through PR. If the system is not
corrupt, the recovery will succeed without reboot. The HPC is submitted
by users and is not part of the file system image. A user must submit a
new HPC after the recovery if needed. A crash of HPC does not trigger any
recovery action. Three more slots are allocated for recovery and it takes 37
seconds to reboot and restore the service. Without the slot boosting, it will
take more than two minutes.
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6.3.3 Comparison
The migrated system was composed of multiple machines. The components
in VM1, VM2, and VM3 were on one machine, and the VM4 and VM5
were separately running on two machines. In order for the comparison to
accurately show how much better the recovery performance of VEER is, the
aggregated resource of the original design must be comparable to the resource
available on the machine running the RT-VMM. In our experiment, it was
hard to meet this condition due to the unavailability of hardware that meets
all the requirements at the comparable speed. The aggregated CPU clock
speeds of the original system is 1266 MHz (400+133+733), while our new
machine has a 750 MHz processor. The differences in the organization also
make it difficult to directly compare certain qualities. For this reason, we do
not directly compare numbers to numbers. Rather, we describe how they are
different and the implications of the differences.
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VM #slots,
normal
#slots,
recover
Method VEER
recovery
time
recovery
time on
equivalent
machine
0 2 10 boot n/a n/a
1 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2 1 3 restart 729us/2.25ms 729us/20.25ms
3 1 3 reboot 37sec 2min
4 2 3 reboot 46sec 70sec
5 3 5 reboot 18sec 30sec
Table 6.4: Comaprison of recovery performance
The partitioning by RT-VMM gives nearly the same degree of isolation
we had in the old systems. If the virtual CPU speed of each corresponding
VM is equivalent to the one in the original design, the normal case and reboot
performance will be roughly the same between old and new design. But the
original system cannot take the resource from the remote machines to speed
up the recovery of the failed machine. This is obviously a unique benefit of
VEER. In addition, the reorganization based on our guideline improves the
robustness of the system by preventing potentially malicious HPC component
from harming others, and failures in the components with low-level access
privileges from being propagated. If all the components were run on the same
operating system on a single machine, it will be hard to enforce and control
each process’s CPU usage and timing in the way RT-VMM does without a
special operating system. However, more serious problem is the lack of fault
isolation. As illustrated earlier, a crash of X server may require a system
reboot. It may also compromise the critical components by corrupting the
kernel or hardware state.
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7 Conclusions
VEER enables strict control of VM timings in both normal and recovery
mode with a reasonably small and predictable overhead, thanks to the use
of RT-VMM. The fault isolation and containment can be improved by sepa-
rating the components according to their criticality and the capability. The
fault propagation is blocked at the component level using analytic redun-
dancy techniques such as eSimplex in addition to the partitioning provided
by RT-VMM. The improved isolation reduces the scope of recovery. There-
fore faster and timely recovery is possible.
By utilizing VEER’s dynamic scheduling policy switching capability, the
share of CPU time can be manipulated. This results in a better control over
how VMs are to be treated in special conditions such as failure-recovery.
When compared to the hypothetical equivalent computers, the components in
VEER can recover significantly faster without affecting critical components,
even when rebooting. This gain comes at the cost of reduced performance
in other less critical or important tasks. It is only possible because all tasks
are running on a single machine.
The current version of VEER has limitations. As in Xen 2.0.7, it does
not support the full ioperm operations, and the I/O space partitioning is
still voluntary; if the guest OS in a privileged VM does not comply, there
is not much we can do. Although IO-MMU-based solution will be ideal for
providing partitioning and virtualization, we can at least provide a strong
isolation in I/O space by using predefined fixed I/O bitmaps and not allow-
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ing non-critical VMs to change it. Since the embedded hardware is mostly
static, this approach will not be much of a problem. If the use of IO-MMU
such as intel VT-d technology (no spec as been released at the time of writ-
ing) becomes common in embedded real-time systems, the implementation
of more complete partitioning and virtualization will be justified.
The Intel processors with the new virtualization support have been re-
leased but are not widely used yet. Some machines are equipped with one,
but are not enabled due to lack of BIOS support. If such a feature becomes
standard in embedded systems, and a better virtualization with less perfor-
mance overhead becomes possible, VEER will most likely add an option for
full virtualization for the better compatibility. VEER inherited its paravir-
tualization architecture from Xen mainly for its performance advantages on
existing hardware platforms. It is still unclear whether Intel VT-x-based full
virtualization will perform better than paravirtualization. It will certainly a
big win over emulation or binary translation-based virtualization techniques.
RT-VMM can be utilized in many other ways. Some require full virtual-
ization. To list a few:
• Resource throttling. Its complete control over resource allocation can
be used for CPU throttling and power management when the guest OS
is not capable of doing it or there is a need to enforce certain policies.
• RT support for any non-RT systems. Non-real-time operating systems
such as Microsoft Windows XP can coexist with a real-time operating
system on one machine. It does not involve modifying non-real-time
OS HAL or any other part, yet real-time processing can be carried
out and the results can be transferred to the non-real-time OS. Single
processor cell phone may one day run one real-time OS and another
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non-real-time OS.
• Predictable prioritization. In consolidated non-real-time environment,
RT-VMM can quantifiably and predictably prioritize certain VMs for
recovery or other special conditions.
• Non-invasive dynamic reconfiguration. For real-time or multimedia sys-
tems such as home media hub, additional services can be safely plugged
in or removed without affecting the performance of the existing ones.
It is this author’s belief that introduction of real-time concepts to the
non-real-time world opens a new opportunity to enable more fine grained
controls. RT-VMM is certainly a promising candidate.
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